May 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Reinit keys at the start of options_act().
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit f08f0e9dde8e8910de5dc42d567629ff410c52f4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 23 16:38:35 2011 -0400 Reinit keys at the start of options_act(). Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options && transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok(). Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. --- changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3228 b/changes/bug3228 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aca810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3228 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Resolve a crash that occured when setting BridgeRelay to 1 with + accounting enabled. Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 46b0cef..1179255 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1172,12 +1172,26 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) or_options_t *options = get_options(); int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; char *msg; + const int transition_affects_workers = + old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options); if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (running_tor && + (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1346,14 +1360,10 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) } } - if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { + if (transition_affects_workers) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { ip_address_changed(0); if (can_complete_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) @@ -1367,9 +1377,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - if (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir) - init_keys(); - if (options->PerConnBWRate != old_options->PerConnBWRate || options->PerConnBWBurst != old_options->PerConnBWBurst) connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options);

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 6802499413f8efd98ad4d578e5ef937cb55c1edc Merge: 16cfca5 f08f0e9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:42:08 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 5dc3c462dcf42488055685e7f4fdb4a1a48003f1 Merge: 4b57ec6 6802499 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:43:25 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Reinit keys at the start of options_act().
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit f08f0e9dde8e8910de5dc42d567629ff410c52f4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 23 16:38:35 2011 -0400 Reinit keys at the start of options_act(). Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options && transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok(). Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. --- changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3228 b/changes/bug3228 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aca810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3228 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Resolve a crash that occured when setting BridgeRelay to 1 with + accounting enabled. Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 46b0cef..1179255 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1172,12 +1172,26 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) or_options_t *options = get_options(); int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; char *msg; + const int transition_affects_workers = + old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options); if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (running_tor && + (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1346,14 +1360,10 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) } } - if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { + if (transition_affects_workers) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { ip_address_changed(0); if (can_complete_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) @@ -1367,9 +1377,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - if (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir) - init_keys(); - if (options->PerConnBWRate != old_options->PerConnBWRate || options->PerConnBWBurst != old_options->PerConnBWBurst) connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 6802499413f8efd98ad4d578e5ef937cb55c1edc Merge: 16cfca5 f08f0e9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:42:08 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 8fc02a8e0ca431e4b61e54ed0aa10e7f0215c340 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:21:43 2011 -0700 Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits Fixes another part of bug 1297. --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a index 459ef65..140b94e 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297a +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -5,4 +5,12 @@ creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part of bug 1297. + - Use the same circuit timeout for client-side introduction + circuits as for other four-hop circuits. Previously, + client-side introduction circuits were closed after the same + timeout as single-hop directory-fetch circuits; this was + appropriate with the static circuit build timeout in 0.2.1.x and + earlier, but caused many hidden service access attempts to fail + with the adaptive CBT introduced in 0.2.2.2-alpha. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes another part of bug 1297. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7289aa5..97ac560 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; struct timeval now; - struct timeval introcirc_cutoff; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; tor_gettimeofday(&now); @@ -307,8 +306,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); - introcirc_cutoff = begindir_cutoff; - while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -325,8 +322,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) cutoff = fourhop_cutoff; else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened) cutoff = cannibalize_cutoff; - else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) - cutoff = introcirc_cutoff; else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) cutoff = close_cutoff; else @@ -337,12 +332,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) #if 0 /* some debug logs, to help track bugs */ - if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - victim->timestamp_created <= introcirc_cutoff && - victim->timestamp_created > general_cutoff) - log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Timing out introduction circuit which we " - "would not have done if it had been a general circuit."); - if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) { if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)

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[tor/master] Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 112d204fadab74426cc802e6d998a53f938a5248 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:03:41 2011 -0700 Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires Fixes part of #1297; bugfix on 48e0228f1e031a709c1deb149c7dfd187c3609cf, when circuit_expire_building was changed to assume that timestamp_dirty was set when a circuit changed purpose to _C_REND_READY. (It wasn't.) --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..459ef65 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Apply circuit timeouts to opened hidden-service-related circuits + based on the correct start time. Previously, we would apply the + circuit build timeout based on time since the circuit's + creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the + circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9cac5f3..6ccd957 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2143,6 +2143,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it. * That's a kludge we should fix. + * + * XXX023 The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related + * circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't + * interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should + * document it more thoroughly to make sure of that. */ time_t timestamp_dirty; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 77e11c2..a542339 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */ introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT + * state. */ + introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); return 0; perm_err: @@ -329,6 +333,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */ rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects + * it to specify when a circuit entered the + * _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */ + rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); } else { log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor."); } @@ -674,6 +682,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for " "rendezvous."); circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */ + circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); /* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather * than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 16cfca501ff27dd11daa9dc75ba9f5d99c48bdf5 Merge: 5f182ea 8fc02a8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:25:07 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug1297a | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 4b57ec6e5eabb822506416bc5cf0e291ff9c0053 Merge: 6917728 16cfca5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:33:54 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/circuituse.c changes/bug1297a | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 112d204fadab74426cc802e6d998a53f938a5248 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:03:41 2011 -0700 Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires Fixes part of #1297; bugfix on 48e0228f1e031a709c1deb149c7dfd187c3609cf, when circuit_expire_building was changed to assume that timestamp_dirty was set when a circuit changed purpose to _C_REND_READY. (It wasn't.) --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..459ef65 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Apply circuit timeouts to opened hidden-service-related circuits + based on the correct start time. Previously, we would apply the + circuit build timeout based on time since the circuit's + creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the + circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9cac5f3..6ccd957 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2143,6 +2143,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it. * That's a kludge we should fix. + * + * XXX023 The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related + * circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't + * interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should + * document it more thoroughly to make sure of that. */ time_t timestamp_dirty; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 77e11c2..a542339 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */ introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT + * state. */ + introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); return 0; perm_err: @@ -329,6 +333,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */ rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects + * it to specify when a circuit entered the + * _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */ + rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); } else { log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor."); } @@ -674,6 +682,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for " "rendezvous."); circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */ + circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); /* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather * than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */

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