May 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make check_private_dir accept g+rx dirs if told to do so.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit b147c01295deb8c09807fda3b5e4945edcfaf81a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 13 14:55:40 2011 -0400 Make check_private_dir accept g+rx dirs if told to do so. --- src/common/util.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/common/util.h | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 86f4141..3f81874 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1665,16 +1665,22 @@ file_status(const char *fname) } /** Check whether dirname exists and is private. If yes return 0. If - * it does not exist, and check==CPD_CREATE is set, try to create it + * it does not exist, and check&CPD_CREATE is set, try to create it * and return 0 on success. If it does not exist, and - * check==CPD_CHECK, and we think we can create it, return 0. Else - * return -1. */ + * check&CPD_CHECK, and we think we can create it, return 0. Else + * return -1. If CPD_GROUP_OK is set, then it's okay if the directory + * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. + */ int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) { int r; struct stat st; char *f; +#ifndef MS_WINDOWS + int mask; +#endif + tor_assert(dirname); f = tor_strdup(dirname); clean_name_for_stat(f); @@ -1686,10 +1692,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) strerror(errno)); return -1; } - if (check == CPD_NONE) { - log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s does not exist.", dirname); - return -1; - } else if (check == CPD_CREATE) { + if (check & CPD_CREATE) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Creating directory %s", dirname); #if defined (MS_WINDOWS) && !defined (WINCE) r = mkdir(dirname); @@ -1701,6 +1704,9 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) strerror(errno)); return -1; } + } else if (!(check & CPD_CHECK)) { + log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s does not exist.", dirname); + return -1; } /* XXXX In the case where check==CPD_CHECK, we should look at the * parent directory a little harder. */ @@ -1728,9 +1734,18 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) tor_free(process_ownername); return -1; } - if (st.st_mode & 0077) { + if (check & CPD_GROUP_OK) { + mask = 0027; + } else { + mask = 0077; + } + if (st.st_mode & mask) { + unsigned new_mode; log_warn(LD_FS, "Fixing permissions on directory %s", dirname); - if (chmod(dirname, 0700)) { + new_mode = st.st_mode; + new_mode |= 0700; /* Owner should have rwx */ + new_mode &= ~mask; /* Clear the other bits that we didn't want set...*/ + if (chmod(dirname, new_mode)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not chmod directory %s: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); return -1; diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index 961b587..f759532 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -286,7 +286,11 @@ file_status_t file_status(const char *filename); /** Possible behaviors for check_private_dir() on encountering a nonexistent * directory; see that function's documentation for details. */ -typedef enum { CPD_NONE, CPD_CREATE, CPD_CHECK } cpd_check_t; +typedef unsigned int cpd_check_t; +#define CPD_NONE 0 +#define CPD_CREATE 1 +#define CPD_CHECK 2 +#define CPD_GROUP_OK 4 int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check); #define OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) #define OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make check_private_dir check for group ownership as appropriate
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit f72e792be5437c9ee11d3f498ed3bb469b46d1bb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun May 15 13:11:48 2011 -0400 Make check_private_dir check for group ownership as appropriate --- src/common/util.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 0e739f2..1bb116b 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #else #include <dirent.h> #include <pwd.h> +#include <grp.h> #endif /* math.h needs this on Linux */ @@ -1736,6 +1737,21 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) tor_free(process_ownername); return -1; } + if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != getgid()) { + struct group *gr; + char *process_groupname = NULL; + gr = getgrgid(getgid()); + process_groupname = gr ? tor_strdup(gr->gr_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); + gr = getgrgid(st.st_gid); + + log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this group (%s, %d) but by group " + "%s (%d). Are you running Tor as the wrong user?", + dirname, process_groupname, (int)getgid(), + gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); + + tor_free(process_groupname); + return -1; + } if (check & CPD_GROUP_OK) { mask = 0027; } else {

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Check permissions on the directory holding a control socket
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 4b800408fa85ce0ac81a308c42d654b3357180d4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 13 15:46:53 2011 -0400 Check permissions on the directory holding a control socket --- changes/bug2792_checkdir | 8 ++++++++ src/or/connection.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2792_checkdir b/changes/bug2792_checkdir new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10de1de --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2792_checkdir @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor features: + - Tor now refuses to create a ControlSocket in a directory that is + world-readable (or group-readable if ControlSocketsGroupWritable + is 0). This is necessary because some operating systems do not + check the permissions on an AF_UNIX socket when programs try to + connect to it. Checking permissions on the directory holding + the socket, however, seems to work everywhere. + diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index ab265df..b7d6fe4 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -853,6 +853,43 @@ warn_too_many_conns(void) } } +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +/** Check whether we should be willing to open an AF_UNIX socket in + * path. Return 0 if we should go ahead and -1 if we shouldn't. */ +static int +check_location_for_unix_socket(or_options_t *options, const char *path) +{ + int r = -1; + char *p = tor_strdup(path); + cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; + if (get_parent_directory(p)<0) + goto done; + + if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) + flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; + + if (check_private_dir(p, flags) < 0) { + char *escpath, *escdir; + escpath = esc_for_log(path); + escdir = esc_for_log(p); + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a control socket in %s, the " + "directory %s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the " + "user%s account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, " + "anybody who can list a socket can conect to it, so Tor is " + "being careful.)", escpath, escdir, + options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable ? " and group" : ""); + tor_free(escpath); + tor_free(escdir); + goto done; + } + + r = 0; + done: + tor_free(p); + return r; +} +#endif + /** Bind a new non-blocking socket listening to the socket described * by listensockaddr. * @@ -947,6 +984,9 @@ connection_create_listener(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, * and listeners at the same time */ tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(get_options(), address) < 0) + goto err; + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", conn_type_to_string(type), address);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix up some comment issues spotted by rransom
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 287f6cb128c890e31faa951be6d42cd6801f4e59 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun May 15 13:03:15 2011 -0400 Fix up some comment issues spotted by rransom --- src/common/compat.c | 7 ++++++- src/common/util.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 3c5e938..fc066da 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1481,7 +1481,12 @@ get_parent_directory(char *fname) fname += 2; } #endif - /* Now we want to remove the final character that */ + /* Now we want to remove all path-separators at the end of the string, + * and to remove the end of the string starting with the path separator + * before the last non-path-separator. In perl, this would be + * s#[/]*$##; s#/[^/]*$##; + * on a unixy platform. + */ cp = fname + strlen(fname); at_end = 1; while (--cp > fname) { diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index d84ed9c..0e739f2 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1664,10 +1664,10 @@ file_status(const char *fname) return FN_ERROR; } -/** Check whether dirname exists and is private. If yes return 0. If - * it does not exist, and check&CPD_CREATE is set, try to create it +/** Check whether dirname exists and is private. If yes return 0. If + * it does not exist, and check&CPD_CREATE is set, try to create it * and return 0 on success. If it does not exist, and - * check&CPD_CHECK, and we think we can create it, return 0. Else + * check&CPD_CHECK, and we think we can create it, return 0. Else * return -1. If CPD_GROUP_OK is set, then it's okay if the directory * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. * If CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY is set, then we don't alter the directory permissions

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add a new flag to check_private_dir to make it _not_ change permissions
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 5d147d8527da3c8cff7f5ab5f0d0185d51fff79b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 13 15:40:03 2011 -0400 Add a new flag to check_private_dir to make it _not_ change permissions We'll need this for checking permissions on the directories that hold control sockets: if somebody says "ControlSocket ~/foo", it would be pretty rude to do a chmod 700 on their homedir. --- src/common/util.c | 7 +++++++ src/common/util.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 3f81874..d84ed9c 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1670,6 +1670,8 @@ file_status(const char *fname) * check&CPD_CHECK, and we think we can create it, return 0. Else * return -1. If CPD_GROUP_OK is set, then it's okay if the directory * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. + * If CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY is set, then we don't alter the directory permissions + * if they are too permissive: we just return -1. */ int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) @@ -1741,6 +1743,11 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) } if (st.st_mode & mask) { unsigned new_mode; + if (check & CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY) { + log_warn(LD_FS, "Permissions on directory %s are too permissive.", + dirname); + return -1; + } log_warn(LD_FS, "Fixing permissions on directory %s", dirname); new_mode = st.st_mode; new_mode |= 0700; /* Owner should have rwx */ diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index f759532..f32709a 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ typedef unsigned int cpd_check_t; #define CPD_CREATE 1 #define CPD_CHECK 2 #define CPD_GROUP_OK 4 +#define CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY 8 int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check); #define OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) #define OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add UnixSocketsGroupWritable config flag
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit d41ac64ad68811d8575db6e456fba470b0c3fde7 Author: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar(a)debian.org> Date: Sat Apr 23 02:35:02 2011 +0200 Add UnixSocketsGroupWritable config flag When running a system-wide instance of Tor on Unix-like systems, having a ControlSocket is a quite handy mechanism to access Tor control channel. But it would be easier if access to the Unix domain socket can be granted by making control users members of the group running the Tor process. This change introduces a UnixSocketsGroupWritable option, which will create Unix domain sockets (and thus ControlSocket) 'g+rw'. This allows ControlSocket to offer same access control measures than ControlPort+CookieAuthFileGroupReadable. See <http://bugs.debian.org/552556> for more details. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/connection.c | 7 +++++++ src/or/or.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index d95d764..d0d0c2f 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) +**UnixSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and + write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make + the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0) + **HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__:: Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process knows the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 6a2742d..c81fc9c 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(ControlPortFileGroupReadable,BOOL, "0"), V(ControlPortWriteToFile, FILENAME, NULL), V(ControlSocket, LINELIST, NULL), + V(UnixSocketsGroupWritable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthentication, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFileGroupReadable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFile, STRING, NULL), @@ -952,7 +953,7 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) } #ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - if (options->ControlSocket) { + if (options->ControlSocket || options->UnixSocketsGroupWritable) { *msg = tor_strdup("Unix domain sockets (ControlSocket) not supported" " on this OS/with this build."); goto rollback; diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 01b533d..d0898c5 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ connection_create_listener(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); goto err; } + if (get_options()->UnixSocketsGroupWritable) { + if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-readable.", address); + tor_close_socket(s); + goto err; + } + } if (listen(s,SOMAXCONN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5647691..b72693f 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2445,6 +2445,7 @@ typedef struct { int ControlPort; /**< Port to listen on for control connections. */ config_line_t *ControlSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on * for control connections. */ + int UnixSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are unix sockets g+rw? */ int DirPort; /**< Port to listen on for directory connections. */ int DNSPort; /**< Port to listen on for DNS requests. */ int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add a function to pull off the final component of a path
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 3b6cbf253494303f612eeb09a6fbb30a7c15c7fa Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 13 15:15:41 2011 -0400 Add a function to pull off the final component of a path --- src/common/compat.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/compat.h | 2 ++ src/or/connection.c | 2 ++ src/test/test_util.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index ea7f9d7..3c5e938 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1467,6 +1467,40 @@ get_user_homedir(const char *username) } #endif +/** Modify fname to contain the name of the directory */ +int +get_parent_directory(char *fname) +{ + char *cp; + int at_end = 1; + tor_assert(fname); +#ifdef MS_WINDOWS + /* If we start with, say, c:, then don't consider that the start of the path + */ + if (fname[0] && fname[1] == ':') { + fname += 2; + } +#endif + /* Now we want to remove the final character that */ + cp = fname + strlen(fname); + at_end = 1; + while (--cp > fname) { + int is_sep = (*cp == '/' +#ifdef MS_WINDOWS + || *cp == '\\' +#endif + ); + if (is_sep) { + *cp = '\0'; + if (! at_end) + return 0; + } else { + at_end = 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + /** Set *addr to the IP address (in dotted-quad notation) stored in c. * Return 1 on success, 0 if c is badly formatted. (Like inet_aton(c,addr), * but works on Windows and Solaris.) diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h index af795ff..eff51ab 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.h +++ b/src/common/compat.h @@ -552,6 +552,8 @@ int switch_id(const char *user); char *get_user_homedir(const char *username); #endif +int get_parent_directory(char *fname); + int spawn_func(void (*func)(void *), void *data); void spawn_exit(void) ATTR_NORETURN; diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 12e00e5..ab265df 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -967,6 +967,8 @@ connection_create_listener(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, goto err; } if (get_options()->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) { + /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all + * platforms. */ if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); tor_close_socket(s); diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 0da45df..23cd059 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -1195,6 +1195,35 @@ test_util_listdir(void *ptr) } } +static void +test_util_parent_dir(void *ptr) +{ + char *cp; + (void)ptr; + +#define T(input,expect_ok,output) \ + do { \ + int ok; \ + cp = tor_strdup(input); \ + ok = get_parent_directory(cp); \ + tt_int_op(ok, ==, expect_ok); \ + if (ok==0) \ + tt_str_op(cp, ==, output); \ + tor_free(cp); \ + } while (0); + + T("/home/wombat/knish", 0, "/home/wombat"); + T("/home/wombat/knish/", 0, "/home/wombat"); + T("./home/wombat/knish/", 0, "./home/wombat"); + T("./wombat", 0, "."); + T("", -1, ""); + T("/", -1, ""); + T("////", -1, ""); + + done: + tor_free(cp); +} + #ifdef MS_WINDOWS static void test_util_load_win_lib(void *ptr) @@ -1286,6 +1315,7 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_TEST(find_str_at_start_of_line, 0), UTIL_TEST(asprintf, 0), UTIL_TEST(listdir, 0), + UTIL_TEST(parent_dir, 0), #ifdef MS_WINDOWS UTIL_TEST(load_win_lib, 0), #endif

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Clean up the 2972 implementation a little
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 4198261291c8edbd5ba1617b7bfe3563e51edbe7 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Apr 23 02:57:53 2011 +0200 Clean up the 2972 implementation a little --- changes/bug2972 | 5 +++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 14 ++++++++++---- src/or/connection.c | 4 ++-- src/or/or.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2972 b/changes/bug2972 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26afcca --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2972 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Allow ControlSockets to be group-writable when the + ControlSocksGroupWritable configuration option is turned on. Patch + by Jérémy Bobbio; implements ticket 2972. + diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index d0d0c2f..1815a8d 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) -**UnixSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**:: +**ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index c81fc9c..614fc48 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(ControlPortFileGroupReadable,BOOL, "0"), V(ControlPortWriteToFile, FILENAME, NULL), V(ControlSocket, LINELIST, NULL), - V(UnixSocketsGroupWritable, BOOL, "0"), + V(ControlSocketsGroupWritable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthentication, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFileGroupReadable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFile, STRING, NULL), @@ -953,9 +953,15 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) } #ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - if (options->ControlSocket || options->UnixSocketsGroupWritable) { - *msg = tor_strdup("Unix domain sockets (ControlSocket) not supported" - " on this OS/with this build."); + if (options->ControlSocket || options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unix domain sockets (ControlSocket) not supported " + "on this OS/with this build."); + goto rollback; + } +#else + if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable && !options->ControlSocket) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Setting ControlSocketGroupWritable without setting" + "a ControlSocket makes no sense."); goto rollback; } #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index d0898c5..12e00e5 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -966,9 +966,9 @@ connection_create_listener(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); goto err; } - if (get_options()->UnixSocketsGroupWritable) { + if (get_options()->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) { if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-readable.", address); + log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index b72693f..b9d8319 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2445,7 +2445,7 @@ typedef struct { int ControlPort; /**< Port to listen on for control connections. */ config_line_t *ControlSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on * for control connections. */ - int UnixSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are unix sockets g+rw? */ + int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */ int DirPort; /**< Port to listen on for directory connections. */ int DNSPort; /**< Port to listen on for DNS requests. */ int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */

1 0

[tor/master] Preserve bridge download status across SETCONF, HUP
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit 2b9c5ee301f705cbf69c725ca749d4ac752c06d3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun May 15 12:46:26 2011 -0400 Preserve bridge download status across SETCONF, HUP This code changes it so that we don't remove bridges immediately when we start re-parsing our configuration. Instead, we mark them all, and remove all the marked ones after re-parsing our bridge lines. As we add a bridge, we see if it's already in the list. If so, we just unmark it. This new behavior will lose the property we used to have that bridges were in bridge_list in the same order in which they appeared in the torrc. I took a quick look through the code, and I'm pretty sure we didn't actually depend on that anywhere. This is for bug 3019; it's a fix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. --- changes/bug3019 | 4 +++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/circuitbuild.h | 9 ++++--- src/or/config.c | 3 +- 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3019 b/changes/bug3019 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4df709f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3019 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Do not reset the bridge descriptor download status every time we + re-parse our configuration or get a configuration change. Fixes + bug 3019; bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index a9986d3..860cd27 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4471,6 +4471,9 @@ typedef struct { tor_addr_t addr; /** TLS port for the bridge. */ uint16_t port; + /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our bridge list, and we are going to remove + * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured bridges. */ + unsigned marked_for_removal : 1; /** Expected identity digest, or all zero bytes if we don't know what the * digest should be. */ char identity[DIGEST_LEN]; @@ -4479,11 +4482,39 @@ typedef struct { } bridge_info_t; /** A list of configured bridges. Whenever we actually get a descriptor - * for one, we add it as an entry guard. */ + * for one, we add it as an entry guard. Note that the order of bridges + * in this list does not necessarily correspond to the order of bridges + * in the torrc. */ static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL; -/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */ +/** Mark every entry of the bridge list to be removed on our next call to + * sweep_bridge_list unless it has first been un-marked. */ +void +mark_bridge_list(void) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_create(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, + b->marked_for_removal = 1); +} + +/** Remove every entry of the bridge list that was marked with + * mark_bridge_list if it has not subsequently been un-marked. */ void +sweep_bridge_list(void) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_create(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) { + if (b->marked_for_removal) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(bridge_list, b); + tor_free(b); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b); +} + +/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */ +static void clear_bridge_list(void) { if (!bridge_list) @@ -4496,7 +4527,8 @@ clear_bridge_list(void) * (either by comparing keys if possible, else by comparing addr/port). * Else return NULL. */ static bridge_info_t * -get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, +get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, const char *digest) { if (!bridge_list) @@ -4537,7 +4569,8 @@ routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri) * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it. */ void -learned_router_identity(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest) +learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest) { bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest); @@ -4549,11 +4582,20 @@ learned_router_identity(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest) } /** Remember a new bridge at addr:port. If digest - * is set, it tells us the identity key too. */ + * is set, it tells us the identity key too. If we already had the + * bridge in our list, unmark it, and don't actually add anything new. */ void -bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest) +bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest) { - bridge_info_t *b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t)); + bridge_info_t *b; + + if ((b = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest))) { + b->marked_for_removal = 0; + return; + } + + b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t)); tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, addr); b->port = port; if (digest) @@ -4561,6 +4603,7 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest) b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE; if (!bridge_list) bridge_list = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); } diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index af24931..0e673e1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, const char *question, char **answer, const char **errmsg); -void clear_bridge_list(void); +void mark_bridge_list(void); +void sweep_bridge_list(void); int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri); -void -learned_router_identity(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); +void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest); void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - char *digest); + const char *digest); void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); void fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now); void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache); diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 0997fe2..6a2742d 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; if (options->Bridges) { - clear_bridge_list(); + mark_bridge_list(); for (cl = options->Bridges; cl; cl = cl->next) { if (parse_bridge_line(cl->value, 0)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, @@ -1180,6 +1180,7 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } } + sweep_bridge_list(); } if (running_tor && rend_config_services(options, 0)<0) {

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '11

16 May '11

commit f2c170218238a38a0106acb1a7428b514ce979ca Merge: aa8db01 2b9c5ee Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun May 15 20:17:17 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/circuitbuild.h changes/bug3019 | 4 +++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/circuitbuild.h | 7 +++-- src/or/config.c | 3 +- 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/circuitbuild.h index 33d483d,0e673e1..87adb9a --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@@ -63,12 -62,13 +63,13 @@@ int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control const char *question, char **answer, const char **errmsg); - void clear_bridge_list(void); + void mark_bridge_list(void); + void sweep_bridge_list(void); -int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri); +int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); - void learned_router_identity(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - char *digest); + const char *digest); void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); void fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now); void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache);

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