May 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[obfsproxy/master] Send SOCKS responses when CONNECT fails.
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit 2fbdd416a982610cd184811371254211afe074ae Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon May 16 03:40:08 2011 +0200 Send SOCKS responses when CONNECT fails. --- src/network.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c index 1199c96..66b3f59 100644 --- a/src/network.c +++ b/src/network.c @@ -341,12 +341,27 @@ output_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bev, short what, void *arg) conn_t *conn = arg; assert(bev == conn->output); - if (conn->flushing || (what & (BEV_EVENT_EOF|BEV_EVENT_ERROR))) { + if (conn->flushing || (what & (BEV_EVENT_EOF))) { printf("Got error: %s\n", evutil_socket_error_to_string(EVUTIL_SOCKET_ERROR())); error_or_eof(conn, bev, conn->input); return; } + /* ASN PROBABLY connect failed and we should send a "fail" SOCKS + response. (or maybe not. I should check all the cases where + BEV_EVENT_ERROR is waved) */ + if (what & BEV_EVENT_ERROR) { + /* assert(conn->socks_state) ? */ + if (conn->socks_state) { + if (socks_state_get_status(conn->socks_state) == ST_HAVE_ADDR) { + dbg(("Connection failed\n")); + bufferevent_enable(conn->input, EV_READ|EV_WRITE); + socks_send_reply(conn->socks_state, bufferevent_get_output(conn->input), + SOCKS5_REP_FAIL); + return; + } + } + } if (what & BEV_EVENT_CONNECTED) { /* woo, we're connected. Now the input buffer can start reading. */ conn->is_open = 1; @@ -373,6 +388,7 @@ output_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bev, short what, void *arg) if (evbuffer_get_length(bufferevent_get_input(conn->input)) != 0) obfuscated_read_cb(bev, conn->input); } + return; } /* XXX we don't expect any other events */ }

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[obfsproxy/master] Send SOCKS responses when CONNECT fails, and also treat our connection better.
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit 84139cb2636cb22c285102eaa9b96e2e00e83a72 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon May 16 18:08:36 2011 +0200 Send SOCKS responses when CONNECT fails, and also treat our connection better. --- src/network.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c index 66b3f59..b0106de 100644 --- a/src/network.c +++ b/src/network.c @@ -341,27 +341,49 @@ output_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bev, short what, void *arg) conn_t *conn = arg; assert(bev == conn->output); - if (conn->flushing || (what & (BEV_EVENT_EOF))) { + /** + If we got the BEV_EVENT_ERROR flag *AND* we are in socks mode + *AND* we are in the ST_HAVE_ADDR state, chances are that we + failed connecting to the host requested by the CONNECT call. This + means that we should send a negative SOCKS reply back to the + client and terminate the connection. + */ + if (what & BEV_EVENT_ERROR) { + if ((conn->mode == LSN_SOCKS_CLIENT) && + (conn->socks_state) && + (socks_state_get_status(conn->socks_state) == ST_HAVE_ADDR)) { + dbg(("Connection failed\n")); + /* Enable EV_WRITE so that we can send the response. + Disable EV_READ so that we don't get more stuff from the client. */ + bufferevent_enable(conn->input, EV_WRITE); + bufferevent_disable(conn->input, EV_READ); + socks_send_reply(conn->socks_state, bufferevent_get_output(conn->input), + SOCKS5_REP_FAIL); + bufferevent_setcb(conn->input, NULL, + close_conn_on_flush, output_event_cb, conn); + return; + } + } + + /** + If the connection is terminating *OR* if we got a BEV_EVENT_ERROR + but we don't match the case above, we most probably have to close + this connection soon. + */ + if (conn->flushing || (what & (BEV_EVENT_EOF|BEV_EVENT_ERROR))) { printf("Got error: %s\n", evutil_socket_error_to_string(EVUTIL_SOCKET_ERROR())); error_or_eof(conn, bev, conn->input); return; } - /* ASN PROBABLY connect failed and we should send a "fail" SOCKS - response. (or maybe not. I should check all the cases where - BEV_EVENT_ERROR is waved) */ - if (what & BEV_EVENT_ERROR) { - /* assert(conn->socks_state) ? */ - if (conn->socks_state) { - if (socks_state_get_status(conn->socks_state) == ST_HAVE_ADDR) { - dbg(("Connection failed\n")); - bufferevent_enable(conn->input, EV_READ|EV_WRITE); - socks_send_reply(conn->socks_state, bufferevent_get_output(conn->input), - SOCKS5_REP_FAIL); - return; - } - } - } + + /** + If we got the BEV_EVENT_CONNECTED flag it means that a connection + request was succesfull and normally that should have been off a + CONNECT request by the SOCKS client. If that's the case we should + send a happy response to the client and switch to start serving + our pluggable transport protocol. + */ if (what & BEV_EVENT_CONNECTED) { /* woo, we're connected. Now the input buffer can start reading. */ conn->is_open = 1;

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit c240efab86d71d8953a36e0599bfc789ee980b71 Merge: e0e8424 bc89ef0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 17 19:53:06 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/bug2752 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++---- src/or/connection.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug2752' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit bc89ef0ca8164f9e6e23e73c01bdb4257fdbce7c Merge: 21ed575 9674fe7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 17 19:51:53 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug2752' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug2752 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++---- src/or/connection.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Add credit to bug2752; correct the issue number in the changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit 9674fe7e2fdafdc7db7fac737c9e668b2a5e989a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 17 19:50:52 2011 -0400 Add credit to bug2752; correct the issue number in the changes file --- changes/bug2752 | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2752 b/changes/bug2752 index 328f11e..b872d33 100644 --- a/changes/bug2752 +++ b/changes/bug2752 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - o Minor bugfixes + o Minor features: - Tor used to limit HttpProxyAuthenticator values to 48 characters. Changed the limit to 512 characters by removing base64 newlines. - Fixes bug 2917. + Fixes bug 2752. Fix by Michael Yakubovich.

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[tor/master] Fix bug2752 : 48-char HTTPProxyAuthenticator limitation
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit a3707a10529c3d90a06149cf0e4bcd28b7b1ab5b Author: Michael Yakubovich <e_zine99(a)yahoo.com> Date: Mon May 16 16:09:35 2011 -0400 Fix bug2752 : 48-char HTTPProxyAuthenticator limitation Bumped the char maximum to 512 for HTTPProxyAuthenticator & HTTPSProxyAuthenticator. Now stripping all '\n' after base64 encoding in alloc_http_authenticator. --- changes/bug2752 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++---- src/or/connection.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2752 b/changes/bug2752 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328f11e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2752 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - Tor used to limit HttpProxyAuthenticator values to 48 characters. + Changed the limit to 512 characters by removing base64 newlines. + Fixes bug 2917. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 614fc48..36a8940 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3398,8 +3398,8 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) { - if (strlen(options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) >= 48) - REJECT("HTTPProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 48 chars)."); + if (strlen(options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) >= 512) + REJECT("HTTPProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 512 chars)."); } if (options->HTTPSProxy) { /* parse it now */ @@ -3412,8 +3412,8 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) { - if (strlen(options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) >= 48) - REJECT("HTTPSProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 48 chars)."); + if (strlen(options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) >= 512) + REJECT("HTTPSProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 512 chars)."); } if (options->Socks4Proxy) { /* parse it now */ diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 5054909..bcdde67 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3232,8 +3232,17 @@ alloc_http_authenticator(const char *authenticator) authenticator, authenticator_length) < 0) { tor_free(base64_authenticator); /* free and set to null */ } else { - /* remove extra \n at end of encoding */ - base64_authenticator[strlen(base64_authenticator) - 1] = 0; + int i = 0, j = 0; + int len = strlen(base64_authenticator); + + /* remove all newline occurrences within the string */ + for (i=0; i < len; ++i) { + if ('\n' != base64_authenticator[i]) { + base64_authenticator[j] = base64_authenticator[i]; + ++j; + } + } + base64_authenticator[j]='\0'; } return base64_authenticator; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix bug2752 : 48-char HTTPProxyAuthenticator limitation
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit a3707a10529c3d90a06149cf0e4bcd28b7b1ab5b Author: Michael Yakubovich <e_zine99(a)yahoo.com> Date: Mon May 16 16:09:35 2011 -0400 Fix bug2752 : 48-char HTTPProxyAuthenticator limitation Bumped the char maximum to 512 for HTTPProxyAuthenticator & HTTPSProxyAuthenticator. Now stripping all '\n' after base64 encoding in alloc_http_authenticator. --- changes/bug2752 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++---- src/or/connection.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2752 b/changes/bug2752 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328f11e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2752 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - Tor used to limit HttpProxyAuthenticator values to 48 characters. + Changed the limit to 512 characters by removing base64 newlines. + Fixes bug 2917. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 614fc48..36a8940 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3398,8 +3398,8 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) { - if (strlen(options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) >= 48) - REJECT("HTTPProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 48 chars)."); + if (strlen(options->HTTPProxyAuthenticator) >= 512) + REJECT("HTTPProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 512 chars)."); } if (options->HTTPSProxy) { /* parse it now */ @@ -3412,8 +3412,8 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) { - if (strlen(options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) >= 48) - REJECT("HTTPSProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 48 chars)."); + if (strlen(options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator) >= 512) + REJECT("HTTPSProxyAuthenticator is too long (>= 512 chars)."); } if (options->Socks4Proxy) { /* parse it now */ diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 5054909..bcdde67 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3232,8 +3232,17 @@ alloc_http_authenticator(const char *authenticator) authenticator, authenticator_length) < 0) { tor_free(base64_authenticator); /* free and set to null */ } else { - /* remove extra \n at end of encoding */ - base64_authenticator[strlen(base64_authenticator) - 1] = 0; + int i = 0, j = 0; + int len = strlen(base64_authenticator); + + /* remove all newline occurrences within the string */ + for (i=0; i < len; ++i) { + if ('\n' != base64_authenticator[i]) { + base64_authenticator[j] = base64_authenticator[i]; + ++j; + } + } + base64_authenticator[j]='\0'; } return base64_authenticator; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug2752' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit bc89ef0ca8164f9e6e23e73c01bdb4257fdbce7c Merge: 21ed575 9674fe7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 17 19:51:53 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug2752' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug2752 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++---- src/or/connection.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add credit to bug2752; correct the issue number in the changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit 9674fe7e2fdafdc7db7fac737c9e668b2a5e989a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 17 19:50:52 2011 -0400 Add credit to bug2752; correct the issue number in the changes file --- changes/bug2752 | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2752 b/changes/bug2752 index 328f11e..b872d33 100644 --- a/changes/bug2752 +++ b/changes/bug2752 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - o Minor bugfixes + o Minor features: - Tor used to limit HttpProxyAuthenticator values to 48 characters. Changed the limit to 512 characters by removing base64 newlines. - Fixes bug 2917. + Fixes bug 2752. Fix by Michael Yakubovich.

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[tor/master] Check onion keys in microdescriptors, too
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 May '11

17 May '11

commit 480a75cbbd8067b32b2954303ca69401bfee58d9 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Apr 28 15:16:54 2011 -0700 Check onion keys in microdescriptors, too --- changes/bug3207 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerparse.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3207 b/changes/bug3207 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65a7dac --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3207 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Require that onion keys have exponent 65537 in microdescriptors too. + Fixes part of bug 3207; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha + diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index be7a3fe..57436f7 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -4336,6 +4336,11 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, } tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY); + if (!crypto_pk_check_key_public_exponent(tok->key)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, + "Relay's onion key had invalid exponent."); + goto next; + } md->onion_pkey = tok->key; tok->key = NULL;

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