April 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'sebastian/bug2704' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit f083347adf40164aac3b77d118ec372c89178d5a Merge: 4c789ec 6fde2b4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 11:07:48 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'sebastian/bug2704' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug2704 | 5 +++++ src/or/rephist.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix compilation in last patch
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit 1cff525973c9e3934a4e1661b721b8a13d20ff72 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 11:14:46 2011 -0400 Fix compilation in last patch --- src/or/rephist.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 9146fce..524cd1d 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -1570,6 +1570,7 @@ rep_hist_update_bwhist_state_section(or_state_t *state, { char *cp; int i,j; + uint64_t maxval; if (*s_values) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(*s_values, char *, val, tor_free(val)); @@ -1603,7 +1604,6 @@ rep_hist_update_bwhist_state_section(or_state_t *state, /* Set i to first position in circular array */ i = (b->num_maxes_set <= b->next_max_idx) ? 0 : b->next_max_idx; for (j=0; j < b->num_maxes_set; ++j,++i) { - uint64_t maxval; if (i >= NUM_TOTALS) i = 0; tor_asprintf(&cp, U64_FORMAT, U64_PRINTF_ARG(b->totals[i] & ~0x3ff));

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix more of bug 2704
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit 6fde2b46d2cc2345ec955b1ed9674a777e5e8716 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 15:33:08 2011 +0200 Fix more of bug 2704 The last entry of the *Maxima values in the state file was inflated by a factor of NUM_SECS_ROLLING_MEASURE (currently 10). This could lead to a wrong maximum value propagating through the state file history. --- changes/bug2704 | 5 +++++ src/or/rephist.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2704 b/changes/bug2704 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..821b38b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2704 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - When writing our maximum bw for the current interval to the state + file, don't wrongly inflate that value by a factor of 10 anymore. + Fixes more of bug 2704. + diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index fb091d5..9146fce 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -1614,7 +1614,8 @@ rep_hist_update_bwhist_state_section(or_state_t *state, } tor_asprintf(&cp, U64_FORMAT, U64_PRINTF_ARG(b->total_in_period & ~0x3ff)); smartlist_add(*s_values, cp); - tor_asprintf(&cp, U64_FORMAT, U64_PRINTF_ARG(b->max_total & ~0x3ff)); + maxval = b->max_total / NUM_SECS_ROLLING_MEASURE; + tor_asprintf(&cp, U64_FORMAT, U64_PRINTF_ARG(maxval & ~0x3ff)); smartlist_add(*s_maxima, cp); }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'sebastian/bug2704' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit f083347adf40164aac3b77d118ec372c89178d5a Merge: 4c789ec 6fde2b4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 11:07:48 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'sebastian/bug2704' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug2704 | 5 +++++ src/or/rephist.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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r24678: {projects} Improve style more (projects/articles/browser-privacy)
by Robert Ransom 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

Author: rransom Date: 2011-04-26 15:06:46 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24678 Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex Log: Improve style more Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:06:06 UTC (rev 24677) +++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:06:46 UTC (rev 24678) @@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ the cache to store identifiers. It does this by limiting the scope of the cache to the top-level origin in the URL bar. This has the effect that commonly sourced content elements are fetched and cached repeatedly, but this -is the desired property. Each of these prevalent content elements can be -crafted to include unique identifiers for each user, tracking users who -attempt to avoid tracking by clearing cookies. +is necessary to prevent linkability: each of these content elements can be +crafted to include an identifier unique to each user, thus tracking users who +attempt to avoid tracking by clearing normal cookies. The Mozilla development wiki describes an origin model improvement for cookie transmission @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ current site. % XXXX I can't tell what this paragraph is supposed to mean. --RR -Similarly, one could imagine this two level dual-keyed origin isolation being +Similarly, one could imagine this two-level dual-keyed origin isolation being deployed to improve similar issues with DOM Storage and cryptographic tokens. Making the origin model for browser identifiers more closely match user

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r24677: {projects} Fix style issues (projects/articles/browser-privacy)
by Robert Ransom 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

Author: rransom Date: 2011-04-26 15:06:06 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24677 Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex Log: Fix style issues Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:05:12 UTC (rev 24676) +++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:06:06 UTC (rev 24677) @@ -313,12 +313,16 @@ standards coordination. Of the major private browsing modes, Google Chrome's Incognito Mode comes the -closest to conveying the idea of ``identity'' to the user, and the +closest to conveying the idea of ``identity'' to the user, and its implementation is also simple as a result. The Incognito Mode window is a -separate, stylized window that clearly conveys an alternate identity is in use -for this window, which can be used concurrent to the non-private identity. -The better UI appears to lead to less mode error (where the user forgets their -private browsing state) compared to other browsers\cite{private-browsing}. +separate, stylized window which clearly conveys that an alternate identity +is in use +in this window, which can be used concurrently with the non-private identity. +The better UI appears to lead to less mode error (in which the user forgets +whether +private browsing is enabled) than other browsers' private browsing +modes\cite{private-browsing}. +% XXXX ‘mode error’? The Mozilla Weave project appears to be proposing an identity-oriented method of managing, syncing, and storing authentication tokens, and also has use

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r24676: {projects} Fix more minor issues (projects/articles/browser-privacy)
by Robert Ransom 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

Author: rransom Date: 2011-04-26 15:05:12 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24676 Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex Log: Fix more minor issues Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:04:37 UTC (rev 24675) +++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:05:12 UTC (rev 24676) @@ -343,17 +343,20 @@ what is going on with respect to the user's relationship to the web. However, all current private browsing modes fall short of protecting against a -network adversary and fail to deal with linkability against a network +network-level adversary and fail to deal with linkability against such an adversary\cite{private-browsing}, claiming that it is outside their threat model\footnotemark. If the user is given a new identity that is still linkable to the previous one due to shortcomings of the browser, this approach has failed as a privacy measure. +% XXXX Define network-level adversary. -\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing the network -adversary is IP address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red +\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing a +network-level +adversary is IP-address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red herring. Users are quite capable of using alternate Internet connections, and it is common practice for ISPs in many parts of the world to rotate user IP -addresses daily, to discourage servers and to impede the spread of malware. +addresses daily, to discourage users from operating servers and to impede the +spread of malware. This is especially true of cellular IP networks.} Linkability solutions within the identity framework would be similar to the

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit 075d904d3935bdc5c608c1e17be835e600d6990c Merge: 5230cc4 4c789ec Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 11:05:54 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/dirserv.h changes/bug2979 | 9 +++++++++ src/or/config.c | 55 ------------------------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Don't leak the local hostname in relay nicknames
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

commit 4c789ec08c8d52c3aab3ab775a86fe2350d584b5 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 05:07:37 2011 +0200 Don't leak the local hostname in relay nicknames Fixes bug 2979, reported by tagnaq. --- changes/bug2979 | 9 ++++++++ src/or/config.c | 55 ------------------------------------------------------ src/or/dirserv.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2979 b/changes/bug2979 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe1f45f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2979 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - If the Nickname configuration option wasn't given, Tor used to pick + a nickname based on the local hostname as the nickname for a relay. + Because nicknames are not very important in today's Tor and the + "Unnamed" nickname has been implemented, this is now problematic + behaviour: It leaks information about the hostname without being + useful at all. Bugfix on tor-0.1.2.2-alpha, which introduced the + Unnamed nickname. Fixes bug 2979, reported by tagnaq. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3770301..9675c73 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -2500,54 +2500,6 @@ is_local_addr(const tor_addr_t *addr) return 0; } -/** Called when we don't have a nickname set. Try to guess a good nickname - * based on the hostname, and return it in a newly allocated string. If we - * can't, return NULL and let the caller warn if it wants to. */ -static char * -get_default_nickname(void) -{ - static const char * const bad_default_nicknames[] = { - "localhost", - NULL, - }; - char localhostname[256]; - char *cp, *out, *outp; - int i; - - if (gethostname(localhostname, sizeof(localhostname)) < 0) - return NULL; - - /* Put it in lowercase; stop at the first dot. */ - if ((cp = strchr(localhostname, '.'))) - *cp = '\0'; - tor_strlower(localhostname); - - /* Strip invalid characters. */ - cp = localhostname; - out = outp = tor_malloc(strlen(localhostname) + 1); - while (*cp) { - if (strchr(LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS, *cp)) - *outp++ = *cp++; - else - cp++; - } - *outp = '\0'; - - /* Enforce length. */ - if (strlen(out) > MAX_NICKNAME_LEN) - out[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN]='\0'; - - /* Check for dumb names. */ - for (i = 0; bad_default_nicknames[i]; ++i) { - if (!strcmp(out, bad_default_nicknames[i])) { - tor_free(out); - return NULL; - } - } - - return out; -} - /** Release storage held by <b>options</b>. */ static void config_free(config_format_t *fmt, void *options) @@ -2976,14 +2928,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (options->Nickname == NULL) { if (server_mode(options)) { - if (!(options->Nickname = get_default_nickname())) { - log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Couldn't pick a nickname based on " - "our hostname; using %s instead.", UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME); options->Nickname = tor_strdup(UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME); - } else { - log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Choosing default nickname '%s'", - options->Nickname); - } } } else { if (!is_legal_nickname(options->Nickname)) { diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h index 569abfc..a8a7060 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.h +++ b/src/or/dirserv.h @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ MAX_V_LINE_LEN \ ) -#define UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME "Unnamed" +#define UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME "Unnamed" int connection_dirserv_flushed_some(dir_connection_t *conn);

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r24675: {projects} Fix more minor issues ?\226?\128?\156password-protected?\226 (projects/articles/browser-privacy)
by Robert Ransom 26 Apr '11

26 Apr '11

Author: rransom Date: 2011-04-26 15:04:37 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24675 Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex Log: Fix more minor issues ?\226?\128?\156password-protected?\226?\128?\157 implies ?\226?\128?\156encrypted?\226?\128?\157 these days, to anyone who has any business using the word ?\226?\128?\156privacy?\226?\128?\157. Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:03:58 UTC (rev 24674) +++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:04:37 UTC (rev 24675) @@ -332,8 +332,8 @@ choice of Firefox Persona\cite{firefox-personas}), or it can be a text area with the user's current favored pseudonym. This idea of identity should then be integrated with the browsing experience. Users should be able to click a -button to get a clean slate for a new identity, and should be able to log in -and out of of password-protected stored encrypted identities, which would +button to get a clean slate for a new identity, and should be able to log into +and out of password-protected stored identities, which would contain the entire state of the browser. This is the direction the Tor Project intends to head in with the Tor Browser Bundle\cite{not-to-toggle}.

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