tor-commits October 2011

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix assert for relay/bridge state change
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 908289894419b8fa331197948cb048f08ff5d035 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 25 15:28:58 2011 +0100 Fix assert for relay/bridge state change When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that by always initializing keys when the state changes. Fixes bug 2433. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug2433 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2433 b/changes/bug2433 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e47c4f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2433 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Don't assert when changing from bridge to relay or vice versa with a controller. + The assert happened because we didn't properly initialize our keys in this case. + Bugfix on 0.2.2.18, fixes bug 2433. Issue first discovered by bastik. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fbfa771..7d7f2c3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1371,11 +1371,12 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); + + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) inform_testing_reachability(); @@ -3763,6 +3764,7 @@ options_transition_affects_workers(or_options_t *old_options, new_options->ServerDNSSearchDomains || old_options->SafeLogging != new_options->SafeLogging || old_options->ClientOnly != new_options->ClientOnly || + public_server_mode(old_options) != public_server_mode(new_options) || !config_lines_eq(old_options->Logs, new_options->Logs)) return 1;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add some asserts to get_{tlsclient|server}_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit dc557e8164003d6c09b620333902d7dae3762794 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 21 13:54:12 2010 -0400 Add some asserts to get_{tlsclient|server}_identity_key We now require that: - Only actual servers should ever call get_server_identity_key - If you're being a client or bridge, the client and server keys should differ. - If you're being a public relay, the client and server keys should be the same. --- src/or/router.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index f7a50ae..96aca88 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -121,13 +121,32 @@ set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest); } +/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as + * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */ +static void +assert_identity_keys_ok(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + if (public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */ + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(0==crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + } else { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */ + if (server_identitykey) + tor_assert(0!=crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + } +} + /** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has - * been set. + * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server. */ crypto_pk_env_t * get_server_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(server_mode(get_options())); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); return server_identitykey; } @@ -155,6 +174,7 @@ crypto_pk_env_t * get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(client_identitykey); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); return client_identitykey; }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] stop asserting at boot
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit cecc5b7aa1030eddcf1a613d103b81f5cb98e959 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 23:50:37 2011 -0400 stop asserting at boot The patch for 3228 made us try to run init_keys() before we had loaded our state file, resulting in an assert inside init_keys. We had moved it too early in the function. Now it's later in the function, but still above the accounting calls. --- src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index ea389ff..16b5e9c 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1277,18 +1277,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: - keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ - if (running_tor && - (transition_affects_workers || - (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || - !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } - } - if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1333,6 +1321,17 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) finish_daemon(options->DataDirectory); } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + /* Write our PID to the PID file. If we do not have write permissions we * will log a warning */ if (running_tor && options->PidFile)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Reinit keys at the start of options_act().
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 55d9e4b8bad18a99d51b0b6347cef46e730dceda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 23 16:38:35 2011 -0400 Reinit keys at the start of options_act(). Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options && transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok(). Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3228 b/changes/bug3228 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aca810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3228 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Resolve a crash that occured when setting BridgeRelay to 1 with + accounting enabled. Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 7d7f2c3..ea389ff 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1269,12 +1269,26 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) or_options_t *options = get_options(); int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; char *msg; + const int transition_affects_workers = + old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options); if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (running_tor && + (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1368,14 +1382,10 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) geoip_remove_old_clients(time(NULL)+(2*60*60)); } - if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { + if (transition_affects_workers) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) @@ -1388,9 +1398,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (dns_reset()) return -1; } - - if (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir) - init_keys(); } /* Maybe load geoip file */

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 41d9d3f90437ae9dbde1590faf0ffc412c68df19 Merge: 4a1a89b cecc5b7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 16:34:45 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 176e122b322753090dea8c446a18aceb68afd93e Merge: dcdcced 41d9d3f Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 16:35:09 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] stop asserting at boot
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it's not in the consensus
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 62c29a93ba78ad6ae91b87755ed8cc0283d27e56 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Feb 16 04:12:37 2011 -0800 Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it's not in the consensus Fixes bug 2572. --- changes/bug2572 | 5 +++++ src/or/router.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2572 b/changes/bug2572 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5cca28 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2572 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it can't force itself + into its routerlist. Fixes bug 2572. + + diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c471599..7354267 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ init_keys(void) /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor(); - if (authdir_mode(options)) { + if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) { const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add some asserts to get_{tlsclient|server}_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Properly refcount client_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 3a890b3b70d53ac864be682f50f07ba07b8f09ba Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 26 18:22:04 2010 +0200 Properly refcount client_identity_key In a2bb0bf we started using a separate client identity key. When we are in "public server mode" (that means not a bridge) we will use the same key. Reusing the key without doing the proper refcounting leads to a segfault on cleanup during shutdown. Fix that. Also introduce an assert that triggers if our refcount falls below 0. That should never happen. --- src/common/crypto.c | 1 + src/or/router.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index c723c33..a444cf1 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ crypto_free_pk_env(crypto_pk_env_t *env) if (--env->refs > 0) return; + tor_assert(env->refs == 0); if (env->key) RSA_free(env->key); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 96aca88..c471599 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ init_keys(void) * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity * key. */ if (public_server_mode(options)) { - set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* set above */ + set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */ } else { if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) return -1;

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tor-commits October 2011