October 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.1] slight tweak to text
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit e740ac08c63f68c00f91aeffcd15bef74208fb69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 18:24:05 2011 -0400 slight tweak to text --- ChangeLog | 6 +++--- ReleaseNotes | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 98ee8a1..5c85e92 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and - other users who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should - be using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. + others who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should be + using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge - would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections + would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un. diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index 7adef6f..b9d32eb 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and - other users who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should - be using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. + others who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should be + using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge - would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections + would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un.

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Don't send a certificate chain on outgoing TLS connections from non-relays
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit 638fdedcf16cf7d6f7c586d36f7ef335c1c9714f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Oct 23 16:06:06 2011 +0000 Don't send a certificate chain on outgoing TLS connections from non-relays --- changes/issue-2011-10-19L | 12 ++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L new file mode 100644 index 0000000..972823e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Security fixes: + + - Don't send TLS certificate chains on outgoing OR connections + from clients and bridges. Previously, each client or bridge + would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections + for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay connected to by a + client or bridge to determine which entry guards it is using. + This is a potential user-tracing bug for *all* users; everyone + who uses Tor's client or hidden service functionality should + upgrade. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on FIXME; found by + frosty_un. + diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index c78a9ec..cc805f8 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -186,9 +186,11 @@ static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, static void tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls); static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, crypto_pk_env_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime); + unsigned int key_lifetime, + int is_client); static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime); + unsigned int key_lifetime, + int is_client); /** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs * to touch them. */ @@ -624,7 +626,7 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, server_identity, - key_lifetime); + key_lifetime, 0); if (rv1 >= 0) { new_ctx = server_tls_context; @@ -640,7 +642,8 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, if (server_identity != NULL) { rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, server_identity, - key_lifetime); + key_lifetime, + 0); } else { tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = server_tls_context; server_tls_context = NULL; @@ -652,7 +655,8 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, rv2 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&client_tls_context, client_identity, - key_lifetime); + key_lifetime, + 1); } return rv1 < rv2 ? rv1 : rv2; @@ -669,10 +673,12 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, crypto_pk_env_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime) + unsigned int key_lifetime, + int is_client) { tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, - key_lifetime); + key_lifetime, + is_client); tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext; if (new_ctx != NULL) { @@ -694,7 +700,8 @@ tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, * certificate. */ static tor_tls_context_t * -tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) +tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, + int is_client) { crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -711,22 +718,26 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) goto error; if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0) goto error; - /* Create certificate signed by identity key. */ - cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2, - key_lifetime); - /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */ - idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2, - IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME); - if (!cert || !idcert) { - log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate"); - goto error; + if (!is_client) { + /* Create certificate signed by identity key. */ + cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2, + key_lifetime); + /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */ + idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2, + IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME); + if (!cert || !idcert) { + log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate"); + goto error; + } } result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); result->refcnt = 1; - result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert); - result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert); - result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa); + if (!is_client) { + result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert); + result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert); + result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa); + } #ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */ @@ -758,27 +769,31 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) #ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); #endif - if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert)) - goto error; - X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */ - cert=NULL; - if (idcert) { - X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx); - tor_assert(s); - X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert); - X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */ - idcert = NULL; + if (! is_client) { + if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert)) + goto error; + X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */ + cert=NULL; + if (idcert) { + X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx); + tor_assert(s); + X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert); + X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */ + idcert = NULL; + } } SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); - tor_assert(rsa); - if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1))) - goto error; - if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey)) - goto error; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx)) - goto error; + if (!is_client) { + tor_assert(rsa); + if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1))) + goto error; + if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey)) + goto error; + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx)) + goto error; + } { crypto_dh_env_t *dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, _crypto_dh_env_get_dh(dh));

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Don't use any OR connection which sent us a CREATE_FAST cell for an EXTEND
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit af12c39d6de5bbcd24915db3c4cc9404f102ac02 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 23 14:27:56 2011 -0700 Don't use any OR connection which sent us a CREATE_FAST cell for an EXTEND Fix suggested by Nick Mathewson. --- changes/issue-2011-10-19L | 9 +++++++++ src/or/command.c | 6 ++++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 5 +++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L index 972823e..1fefd72 100644 --- a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L +++ b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L @@ -10,3 +10,12 @@ upgrade. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on FIXME; found by frosty_un. + - Don't use any OR connection on which we have received a + CREATE_FAST cell to satisfy an EXTEND request. Previously, we + would not consider whether a connection appears to be from a + client or bridge when deciding whether to use that connection to + satisfy an EXTEND request. Mitigates CVE-2011-2768, by + preventing an attacker from determining whether an unpatched + client is connected to a patched relay. Bugfix on FIXME; found + by frosty_un. + diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 61b898c..a17a3a6 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -285,7 +285,13 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) * a CPU worker. */ char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; char reply[DIGEST_LEN*2]; + tor_assert(cell->command == CELL_CREATE_FAST); + + /* Make sure we never try to use the OR connection on which we + * received this cell to satisfy an EXTEND request, */ + conn->is_connection_with_client = 1; + if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, (uint8_t*)reply, (uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys))<0) { log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing."); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 95cc02e..35f6da9 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -519,6 +519,11 @@ connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest, tor_assert(tor_memeq(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); if (conn->_base.marked_for_close) continue; + /* Never return a connection on which the other end appears to be + * a client. */ + if (conn->is_connection_with_client) { + continue; + } /* Never return a non-open connection. */ if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { /* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 4105ff4..72e4c63 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1031,6 +1031,10 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { * because the connection is too old, or because there's a better one, etc. */ unsigned int is_bad_for_new_circs:1; + /** True iff we have decided that the other end of this connection + * is a client. Connections with this flag set should never be used + * to satisfy an EXTEND request. */ + unsigned int is_connection_with_client:1; uint8_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for * "none negotiated yet." */ circid_t next_circ_id; /**< Which circ_id do we try to use next on

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Mark which OR connections are outgoing
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit c05bb53508f5fe3e570a285e6c9ead452ded0e43 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 23 14:58:00 2011 -0700 Mark which OR connections are outgoing --- src/or/connection_or.c | 2 ++ src/or/or.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 35f6da9..f019c79 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -776,6 +776,8 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING; control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); + conn->is_outgoing = 1; + if (options->HttpsProxy) { /* we shouldn't connect directly. use the https proxy instead. */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, options->HttpsProxyAddr); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 72e4c63..edbb73c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1035,6 +1035,8 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { * is a client. Connections with this flag set should never be used * to satisfy an EXTEND request. */ unsigned int is_connection_with_client:1; + /** True iff this is an outgoing connection. */ + unsigned int is_outgoing:1; uint8_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for * "none negotiated yet." */ circid_t next_circ_id; /**< Which circ_id do we try to use next on

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Reject create cells on outgoing OR connections from bridges
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit a74e7fd40f1a77eb4000d8216bb5b80cdd8a6193 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 23 15:21:49 2011 -0700 Reject create cells on outgoing OR connections from bridges --- changes/issue-2011-10-23G | 9 +++++++++ src/or/command.c | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-23G b/changes/issue-2011-10-23G new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45f8675 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/issue-2011-10-23G @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Security fixes: + + - Reject CREATE and CREATE_FAST cells on outgoing OR connections + from a bridge to a relay. Previously, we would accept them and + handle them normally, thereby allowing a malicious relay to + easily distinguish bridges which connect to it from clients. + Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, when bridges were + implemented; found by frosty_un. + diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index a17a3a6..54f23bb 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ static void command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) { or_circuit_t *circ; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int id_is_high; if (we_are_hibernating()) { @@ -230,9 +231,11 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) return; } - if (!server_mode(get_options())) { + if (!server_mode(options) || + (!public_server_mode(options) && conn->is_outgoing)) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Received create cell (type %d) from %s:%d, but we're a client. " + "Received create cell (type %d) from %s:%d, but we're connected " + "to it as a client. " "Sending back a destroy.", (int)cell->command, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit 6097b8eefc40a581e9ca4a25cc5f14a1f9ecb3c3 Merge: 031d8fc a74e7fd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 17:41:24 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1 changes/issue-2011-10-19L | 21 ++++++++++ changes/issue-2011-10-23G | 9 ++++ src/common/tortls.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- src/or/command.c | 13 +++++- src/or/connection_or.c | 7 +++ src/or/or.h | 6 +++ 6 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.1] bump to 0.2.1.31
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit 484240c4b86283ddb139f309ed768a776db43cad Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 18:03:26 2011 -0400 bump to 0.2.1.31 --- configure.in | 2 +- contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index 7f7dd2f..f654361 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_INIT -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.30) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.31) AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h) AC_CANONICAL_HOST diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 0aae2c7..efb3208 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.1.30" +!define VERSION "0.2.1.31" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 5468eaa..12af228 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -226,6 +226,6 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.1.30" +#define VERSION "0.2.1.31"

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[tor/release-0.2.1] fold in changes files
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit 6bb9bd17d0d21ee32f7010a307bf35bf7d5b5cc0 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 18:02:13 2011 -0400 fold in changes files --- ChangeLog | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- changes/issue-2011-10-19L | 21 --------------------- changes/issue-2011-10-23G | 9 --------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 9aef0e5..4a74ecf 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,13 +1,33 @@ -Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-05-?? +Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 Tor 0.2.1.31 fixes a variety of potential privacy problems. - o Security/privacy fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): + o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations with versions whose runtime does not depend on the data being compared. This will help resist a class of attacks where an adversary can use variations in timing information to learn sensitive data. Fix for one case of bug 3122. (Safe memcmp implementation by Robert Ransom based partially on code by DJB.) + - Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6 + addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when + somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. + + o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): + - Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on + outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge + would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections + for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or + bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using. + Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un. + - If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it + no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a + circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the + CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet. + - Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections + that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge + connections from client connections, creating another avenue for + enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. + Found by "frosty_un". - When receiving a hidden service descriptor, check that it is for the hidden service we wanted. Previously, Tor would store any hidden service descriptors that a directory gave it, whether it @@ -21,9 +41,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-05-?? requests for "all" descriptors. It used to include bridge descriptors in its answer, which was a major information leak. Found by "piebeer". Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - - Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6 - addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when - somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. - Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L deleted file mode 100644 index 1fefd72..0000000 --- a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ - o Security fixes: - - - Don't send TLS certificate chains on outgoing OR connections - from clients and bridges. Previously, each client or bridge - would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections - for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay connected to by a - client or bridge to determine which entry guards it is using. - This is a potential user-tracing bug for *all* users; everyone - who uses Tor's client or hidden service functionality should - upgrade. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on FIXME; found by - frosty_un. - - - Don't use any OR connection on which we have received a - CREATE_FAST cell to satisfy an EXTEND request. Previously, we - would not consider whether a connection appears to be from a - client or bridge when deciding whether to use that connection to - satisfy an EXTEND request. Mitigates CVE-2011-2768, by - preventing an attacker from determining whether an unpatched - client is connected to a patched relay. Bugfix on FIXME; found - by frosty_un. - diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-23G b/changes/issue-2011-10-23G deleted file mode 100644 index 45f8675..0000000 --- a/changes/issue-2011-10-23G +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - o Security fixes: - - - Reject CREATE and CREATE_FAST cells on outgoing OR connections - from a bridge to a relay. Previously, we would accept them and - handle them normally, thereby allowing a malicious relay to - easily distinguish bridges which connect to it from clients. - Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, when bridges were - implemented; found by frosty_un. -

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[tor/release-0.2.1] opt for a short and sweet release blurb for 0.2.1.31.
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit 4f699cd24aa8c1f971b02ada6ce80708f80e96b0 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 18:09:28 2011 -0400 opt for a short and sweet release blurb for 0.2.1.31. anybody who's reading it to decide whether to use it should not be using it. --- ChangeLog | 5 ++- ReleaseNotes | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 4a74ecf..98ee8a1 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 - Tor 0.2.1.31 fixes a variety of potential privacy problems. + Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for + oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and + other users who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should + be using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): - Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index 7ba473e..7adef6f 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -3,6 +3,115 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. +Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26 + Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for + oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and + other users who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should + be using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer. + + o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): + - Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations + with versions whose runtime does not depend on the data being + compared. This will help resist a class of attacks where an + adversary can use variations in timing information to learn + sensitive data. Fix for one case of bug 3122. (Safe memcmp + implementation by Robert Ransom based partially on code by DJB.) + - Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6 + addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when + somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. + + o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): + - Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on + outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge + would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections + for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or + bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using. + Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un. + - If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it + no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a + circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the + CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet. + - Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections + that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge + connections from client connections, creating another avenue for + enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. + Found by "frosty_un". + - When receiving a hidden service descriptor, check that it is for + the hidden service we wanted. Previously, Tor would store any + hidden service descriptors that a directory gave it, whether it + wanted them or not. This wouldn't have let an attacker impersonate + a hidden service, but it did let directories pre-seed a client + with descriptors that it didn't want. Bugfix on 0.0.6. + - Avoid linkability based on cached hidden service descriptors: forget + all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a + SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000; bugfix on 0.0.6. + - Make the bridge directory authority refuse to answer directory + requests for "all" descriptors. It used to include bridge + descriptors in its answer, which was a major information leak. + Found by "piebeer". Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. + - Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL + NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous + circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a + long-lived stream, or if a new stream were attached to it before + Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use). Bugfix on + 0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375. + + o Minor bugfixes (also included in 0.2.2.x): + - When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection + from the outside before we've started our reachability tests, + triggering a warning: "ORPort found reachable, but I have no + routerinfo yet. Failing to inform controller of success." This + bug was harmless unless Tor is running under a controller + like Vidalia, in which case the controller would never get a + REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED status event. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha; + fixes bug 1172. + - Build correctly on OSX with zlib 1.2.4 and higher with all warnings + enabled. Fixes bug 1526. + - Remove undocumented option "-F" from tor-resolve: it hasn't done + anything since 0.2.1.16-rc. + - Avoid signed/unsigned comparisons by making SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned. + None of the cases where we did this before were wrong, but by making + this change we avoid warnings. Fixes bug 2475; bugfix on 0.2.1.28. + - Fix a rare crash bug that could occur when a client was configured + with a large number of bridges. Fixes bug 2629; bugfix on + 0.2.1.2-alpha. Bugfix by trac user "shitlei". + - Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds + the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found by + John Brooks. + - Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under + heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + - When warning about missing zlib development packages during compile, + give the correct package names. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + - Require that introduction point keys and onion keys have public + exponent 65537. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. + - Do not crash when our configuration file becomes unreadable, for + example due to a permissions change, between when we start up + and when a controller calls SAVECONF. Fixes bug 3135; bugfix + on 0.0.9pre6. + - Fix warnings from GCC 4.6's "-Wunused-but-set-variable" option. + Fixes bug 3208. + - Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before + passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are + smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity; + CID #428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha. + - Don't stack-allocate the list of supplementary GIDs when we're + about to log them. Stack-allocating NGROUPS_MAX gid_t elements + could take up to 256K, which is way too much stack. Found by + Coverity; CID #450. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (only in 0.2.1.x): + - Resume using micro-version numbers in 0.2.1.x: our Debian packages + rely on them. Bugfix on 0.2.1.30. + - Use git revisions instead of svn revisions when generating our + micro-version numbers. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402. + + o Minor features (also included in 0.2.2.x): + - Adjust the expiration time on our SSL session certificates to + better match SSL certs seen in the wild. Resolves ticket 4014. + - Allow nameservers with IPv6 address. Resolves bug 2574. + - Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + Changes in version 0.2.1.30 - 2011-02-23 Tor 0.2.1.30 fixes a variety of less critical bugs. The main other change is a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes relays

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[tor/maint-0.2.1] Don't use any OR connection which sent us a CREATE_FAST cell for an EXTEND
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Oct '11

28 Oct '11

commit af12c39d6de5bbcd24915db3c4cc9404f102ac02 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 23 14:27:56 2011 -0700 Don't use any OR connection which sent us a CREATE_FAST cell for an EXTEND Fix suggested by Nick Mathewson. --- changes/issue-2011-10-19L | 9 +++++++++ src/or/command.c | 6 ++++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 5 +++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L index 972823e..1fefd72 100644 --- a/changes/issue-2011-10-19L +++ b/changes/issue-2011-10-19L @@ -10,3 +10,12 @@ upgrade. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on FIXME; found by frosty_un. + - Don't use any OR connection on which we have received a + CREATE_FAST cell to satisfy an EXTEND request. Previously, we + would not consider whether a connection appears to be from a + client or bridge when deciding whether to use that connection to + satisfy an EXTEND request. Mitigates CVE-2011-2768, by + preventing an attacker from determining whether an unpatched + client is connected to a patched relay. Bugfix on FIXME; found + by frosty_un. + diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 61b898c..a17a3a6 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -285,7 +285,13 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) * a CPU worker. */ char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; char reply[DIGEST_LEN*2]; + tor_assert(cell->command == CELL_CREATE_FAST); + + /* Make sure we never try to use the OR connection on which we + * received this cell to satisfy an EXTEND request, */ + conn->is_connection_with_client = 1; + if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, (uint8_t*)reply, (uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys))<0) { log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing."); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 95cc02e..35f6da9 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -519,6 +519,11 @@ connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest, tor_assert(tor_memeq(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); if (conn->_base.marked_for_close) continue; + /* Never return a connection on which the other end appears to be + * a client. */ + if (conn->is_connection_with_client) { + continue; + } /* Never return a non-open connection. */ if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { /* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 4105ff4..72e4c63 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1031,6 +1031,10 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { * because the connection is too old, or because there's a better one, etc. */ unsigned int is_bad_for_new_circs:1; + /** True iff we have decided that the other end of this connection + * is a client. Connections with this flag set should never be used + * to satisfy an EXTEND request. */ + unsigned int is_connection_with_client:1; uint8_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for * "none negotiated yet." */ circid_t next_circ_id; /**< Which circ_id do we try to use next on

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