commit 513c47a31129b69ba646768e90523038318398ff
Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org>
Date: Sun Oct 2 16:45:11 2011 +0000
Update translations for orbot
---
values-hu/strings.xml | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/values-hu/strings.xml b/values-hu/strings.xml
index 5e51fc9..d135dd2 100644
--- a/values-hu/strings.xml
+++ b/values-hu/strings.xml
@@ -57,33 +57,37 @@
<string name="btn_finish"…
[View More]>Befejezés</string>
<string name="btn_okay">OK</string>
<string name="btn_cancel">Mégsem</string>
- <string name="wizard_welcome_msg"></string>
- <string name="wizard_details">Néhány Orbot részlet</string>
+ <string name="wizard_welcome_msg">Az Orbot elérhetővé teszi a Tor-t Android-on. A Tor egy ingynes szoftver és egy nyílt hálózat, amely védi a hálózati megfigyeléstől, ezáltal magánéletét és személyes szabadságát, bizalmas üzleti tevékenységeit és kapcsolatait, védi az állami szervek forgalom elemzésétől.\n\n*FIGYELEM:* Az Orbot telepítése _NEM_ egy varázslattal teszi névtelenné mobil forgalmát! Ez a varázsló végigvezeti a kezdeteken.</string>
+ <string name="wizard_details">Néhány Orbot Tudnivaló</string>
<string name="wizard_details_msg">Az Orbot egy nyílt forrás alkalmazás, ami a Tor, a LibEvent és Privoxy csomagot tartalmazza. Szolgáltatása egy helyi HTTP proxy (8118) és egy SOCKS proxy (9050) a Tor hálózat felé. Az Orbot további tulajdonsága, hogy rootolt készülék esetén képes a teljes internet forgalom Tor hálózaton keresztül küldésére.</string>
<string name="wizard_permissions_root">Jogosultság megadva</string>
<string name="wizard_permissions_stock">Orbot Jogosultságok</string>
- <string name="wizard_premissions_msg_root"></string>
- <string name="wizard_permissions_msg_stock"></string>
- <string name="wizard_permissions_no_root"></string>
+ <string name="wizard_premissions_msg_root">Csodálatos! Úgy észleltük, hogy root joggot engedélyezett az Orbot számára. Ezt az erőt bölcsen fogjuk használni.</string>
+ <string name="wizard_permissions_msg_stock"> Habár nem szükséges, az Orbot sokkal hatékonyabb eszköz lehet, ha a készüléknek van root hozzáférése. Használja az alábbi gombot, hogy szupererőt az Orbot-nak! </string>
+ <string name="wizard_permissions_no_root">Ha nincs root hozzáférése, vagy lövése sincs miről beszélünk, csak legyen biztos abban,hogy olyan alkalmazást használ, amelyek képesek együttműködni az Orbot-tal.</string>
<string name="wizard_permissions_consent">Értettem és root jog nélkül folytatnám tovább</string>
<string name="wizard_permission_enable_root">Root jog adása az Orbot részére</string>
<string name="wizard_configure">Tor-izálás beállítása</string>
- <string name="wizard_configure_msg"></string>
+ <string name="wizard_configure_msg">Az Orbot lehetővé teszi, hogy az összes alkalmazás forgalmát VAGY az egyesével kiválasztott alkalmazások forgalmát keresztül küldje a Tor-on.</string>
<string name="wizard_configure_all">Minden alkalmazás keresztülproxyzása a Tor-on</string>
<string name="wizard_configure_select_apps">Alkalmazások kiválasztása a Tor-hoz</string>
<string name="wizard_tips_tricks">Orbot-engedélyezett alkalmazások</string>
- <string name="wizard_tips_msg"></string>
+ <string name="wizard_tips_msg">Javasoljuk, hogy töltsön le és használjon olyan alkalmazásokat, amelyek tudják, hogyna kell közvetlenül kapcsolódni az Orbot-hoz. Kattintson az gombokra alább a telepítéshez.</string>
<string name="wizard_tips_otrchat">Gibberbot - Biztonságos azonnali üzenetküldő kliens Android-ra</string>
<string name="wizard_tips_orweb">ORWEB (csak Android 1.x) - Böngésző, kifejezetten adatvédelemre és az Orbot-hoz</string>
<string name="wizard_tips_proxy">Proxy beállítások - Tanulja meg, hogyan állíthatja be alkalmazásait, hogy együttműködjenek az Orbot-tal</string>
<string name="wizard_proxy_help_info">Proxy beállítások</string>
- <string name="wizard_proxy_help_msg"></string>
+ <string name="wizard_proxy_help_msg">Ha az Android alkalmazás, amit használ képes a HTTP vagy SOCKS proxy-k használatára, akkor be tudja állítani, hogy csatlakozzon az Orbot-hoz és használj a Tor-t.\n\n
+ A host beállítás 127.0.0.1 vagy \"localhost\". A HTTP-hez a port értéke 8118. A SOCKS esetében a proxy port értéke 9050. SOCKS4A vagy SOCKS5 proxy javasolt használnia, ha lehetséges.
+ \n\n
+ További információkat talál a proxyzásról Android készülékne a FAQ szekcióban az alábbi oldalon: http://tinyurl.com/proxyandroid
+ </string>
<string name="wizard_final">Az Orbot kész!</string>
- <string name="wizard_final_msg"></string>
+ <string name="wizard_final_msg">Több száezren használják szerte a világon a Tor-t különböző okokból: újságírók, bloggerek, emberi jogi aktivisták, rendvédelmi szervek dolgozói, katonák, vállalatok, elnyomó rezsimek polgárai, vagy csak egyszerű polgárok... és most készen áll erre Ön is!</string>
<string name="otrchat_apk_url">market://search?q=pname:info.guardianproject.otr.app.im</string>
<string name="orweb_apk_url">market://search?q=pname:nfo.guardianproject.browser</string>
- <string name="connect_first_time"></string>
- <string name="tor_check"></string>
+ <string name="connect_first_time"> Sikeresen csatlakozott a Tor hálózathoz - de ez NEM azt jelenti, hogy a készüléke biztonságos. Ellenőrizze az \'Ellenőrzés\' opcióval a menüből a böngészőjét.\n\nLátogassa meg a https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot oldalt vagy küldjön emailt a help(a)guardianproject.info címre a további információkért.</string>
+ <string name="tor_check">Ez megnyitja az alapértelmezett böngészőt, és elnavigálja a https://check.torproject.orgoldalra, hogy ellenőrizze, hogy az Orbot helyesen konfigurált-e, és hogy csatlakozott-e a Tor hálózathoz.</string>
<string name="pref_hs_group">Rejtett szolgáltatások</string>
<string name="pref_general_group">Általános</string>
<string name="pref_start_boot_title">Az Orbot indítása bekapcsoláskor</string>
[View Less]
Author: mikeperry
Date: 2011-10-02 07:42:56 +0000 (Sun, 02 Oct 2011)
New Revision: 25146
Modified:
website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
Log:
Add a couple extra sentences to the two design requirements
sections, describing their purpose.
Modified: website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en 2011-10-01 15:43:17 UTC (rev 25145)
+++ …
[View More]website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en 2011-10-02 07:42:56 UTC (rev 25146)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
-<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torproject org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
"email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn_torproject\org">erinn_torproject\org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject\org">sjmurdoch#torproject\org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Sep 29 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2555242">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#privacy">2.2. Priv
acy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">3. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">3.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">3.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">3.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">3.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">3.5. Cross-Domain Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">3.6. Cross-Domain Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">3.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#click-to-play">3.8. Click
-to-play for plugins and invasive content</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">3.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Packaging">4. Packaging</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#build-security">4.1. Build Process Security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#addons">4.2. External Addons</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#prefs">4.3. Pref Changes</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#update-mechanism">4.4. Update Security</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Testing">5. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">5.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2555242"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torproject org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
"email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn_torproject\org">erinn_torproject\org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject\org">sjmurdoch#torproject\org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Sep 29 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2974058">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#privacy">2.2. Priv
acy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">3. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">3.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">3.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">3.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">3.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">3.5. Cross-Domain Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">3.6. Cross-Domain Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">3.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#click-to-play">3.8. Click
-to-play for plugins and invasive content</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">3.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Packaging">4. Packaging</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#build-security">4.1. Build Process Security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#addons">4.2. External Addons</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#prefs">4.3. Pref Changes</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#update-mechanism">4.4. Update Security</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Testing">5. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">5.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2974058"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
This document describes the <a class="link" href="#adversary" title="1.1. Adversary Model">adversary model</a>,
<a class="link" href="#DesignRequirements" title="2. Design Requirements and Philosophy">design requirements</a>,
@@ -191,7 +191,9 @@
The security requirements are primarily concerned with ensuring the safe use
of Tor. Violations in these properties typically result in serious risk for
-the user in terms of immediate deanonymization and/or observability.
+the user in terms of immediate deanonymization and/or observability. With
+respect to platform support, security requirements are the minimum properties
+in order for Tor to support the use of a web client platform.
</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Proxy Obedience</strong></span><p>The browser
MUST NOT bypass Tor proxy settings for any content.</p></li><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>State Separation</strong></span><p>The browser MUST NOT provide any stored state to the content window
@@ -210,8 +212,10 @@
</p></li><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Update Safety</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT perform unsafe updates or upgrades.</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2.2. Privacy Requirements"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="privacy"></a>2.2. Privacy Requirements</h3></div></div></div><p>
The privacy requirements are primarily concerned with reducing linkability:
-the ability for a user's activity on one site to be linked with their
-activity on another site without their knowledge or explicit consent.
+the ability for a user's activity on one site to be linked with their activity
+on another site without their knowledge or explicit consent. With respect to
+platform support, privacy requirements are the set of properties that cause us
+to prefer one platform over another.
</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Cross-Domain Identifier Unlinkability</strong></span><p>
@@ -367,13 +371,13 @@
Tor Browser State is separated from existing browser state through use of a
custom Firefox profile. Furthermore, plugins are disabled, which prevents
Flash cookies from leaking from a pre-existing Flash directory.
- </p></div><div class="sect2" title="3.3. Disk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>3.3. Disk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2561771"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </p></div><div class="sect2" title="3.3. Disk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>3.3. Disk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2980587"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
Tor Browser should optionally prevent all disk records of browser activity.
The user should be able to optionally enable URL history and other history
features if they so desire. Once we <a class="ulink" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3100" target="_top">simplify the
preferences interface</a>, we will likely just enable Private Browsing
mode by default to handle this goal.
- </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2587990"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3006806"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
For now, Tor Browser blocks write access to the disk through Torbutton
using several Firefox preferences.
@@ -439,7 +443,7 @@
into specific types of state. An exmaple of this simplifcation can be seen in
Figure 1.
- </p><div class="figure"><a id="id2543955"></a><p class="title"><b>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="CookieManagers.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
+ </p><div class="figure"><a id="id2962771"></a><p class="title"><b>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="CookieManagers.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
On the left is the standard Firefox cookie manager. On the right is a mock-up
of how isolating identifiers to the URL bar domain might simplify the privacy
@@ -760,11 +764,11 @@
</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="new-identity"></a>3.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</h3></div></div></div><p>
In order to avoid long-term linkability, we provide a "New Identity" context
menu option in Torbutton.
- </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2573074"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2991890"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
All linkable identifiers and browser state should be cleared by this feature.
- </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2588627"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3007443"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
First, Torbutton disables
all open tabs and windows via nsIContentPolicy blocking, and then closes each
tab and window. The extra step for blocking tabs is done as a precaution to
@@ -865,7 +869,7 @@
This patch prevents random URLs from being inserted into content-prefs.sqllite in
the profile directory as content prefs change (includes site-zoom and perhaps
other site prefs?).
- </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Packaging"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="Packaging"></a>4. Packaging</h2></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Build Process Security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="build-security"></a>4.1. Build Process Security</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. External Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="addons"></a>4.2. External Addons</h3></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="sect3" title="Included Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2555211"></a>Included Addons</h4></div></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Excluded Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2581163"></a>Excluded Addons</h4></div></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Dangerous Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 cla
ss="title"><a id="id2587402"></a>Dangerous Addons</h4></div></div></div></div></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Pref Changes"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="prefs"></a>4.3. Pref Changes</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.4. Update Security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="update-mechanism"></a>4.4. Update Security</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="Testing"></a>5. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Packaging"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="Packaging"></a>4. Packaging</h2></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Build Process Security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="build-security"></a>4.1. Build Process Security</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. External Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="addons"></a>4.2. External Addons</h3></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="sect3" title="Included Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2974027"></a>Included Addons</h4></div></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Excluded Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2999979"></a>Excluded Addons</h4></div></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Dangerous Addons"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 cla
ss="title"><a id="id3006218"></a>Dangerous Addons</h4></div></div></div></div></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Pref Changes"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="prefs"></a>4.3. Pref Changes</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.4. Update Security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="update-mechanism"></a>4.4. Update Security</h3></div></div></div><p> </p></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="Testing"></a>5. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p>
The purpose of this section is to cover all the known ways that Tor browser
security can be subverted from a penetration testing perspective. The hope
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commit c725da03ecc54934eb52582a785ccedd4c012b4b
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org>
Date: Sat Oct 1 20:39:06 2011 -0700
Bug #4058: Fix yet more issues with links opening in new tabs
Fix is to only clear window.name for top-level windows, and to ignore
frames/iframes.
---
src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 9 ++++++---
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
index …
[View More]decc37c..a9b8b59 100644
--- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
+++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
@@ -4375,14 +4375,17 @@ function torbutton_hookdoc(win, doc, state_change, referrer) {
// The about:blank check handles the 'name' attribute of framesets, which
// get set before the referer is set on the channel.
if ((!referrer || referrer.spec == "") && win.location != "about:blank") {
- win.name = "";
- win.window.name = "";
+ if (win.top == win.window) {
+ // Only reset if we're the top-level window
+ torbutton_log(4, "Resetting window.name: "+win.name+" for "+win.location);
+ win.name = "";
+ win.window.name = "";
+ }
}
} catch(e) {
torbutton_log(4, "Failed to reset window.name: "+e)
}
-
var js_enabled = m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("javascript.enabled");
// No need to hook js if tor is off
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commit 398bd5795765fc3567ff65e07657fa396d5b06dc
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org>
Date: Sat Oct 1 16:19:53 2011 -0700
Bug 4161: TBB version check fails with SocksPort auto
The fix is to set the network.proxy prefs if this is TBB.
We also add the version check to the codepath that restores torbutton state,
just in case there is another regression.
---
src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 files changed, …
[View More]27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
index a884ba2..aad6f89 100644
--- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
+++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
@@ -758,12 +758,18 @@ function torbutton_init_prefs() {
if (environ.exists("TOR_SOCKS_PORT")) {
torprefs.setIntPref('socks_port', parseInt(environ.get("TOR_SOCKS_PORT")));
+ if (m_tb_tbb) {
+ m_tb_prefs.setIntPref('network.proxy.socks_port', parseInt(environ.get("TOR_SOCKS_PORT")));
+ }
} else {
torprefs.setIntPref('socks_port', 9050);
}
if (environ.exists("TOR_SOCKS_HOST")) {
torprefs.setCharPref('socks_host', environ.get("TOR_SOCKS_HOST"));
+ if (m_tb_tbb) {
+ m_tb_prefs.setIntPref('network.proxy.socks', parseInt(environ.get("TOR_SOCKS_HOST")));
+ }
} else {
torprefs.setCharPref('socks_host', '127.0.0.1');
}
@@ -2824,6 +2830,25 @@ function torbutton_tag_new_browser(browser, tor_tag, no_plugins) {
}
}
+function torbutton_do_versioncheck() {
+ if (m_tb_tbb && m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.versioncheck_enabled")) {
+ var is_updated = torbutton_check_version();
+ var locale = m_tb_prefs.getCharPref("general.useragent.locale");
+ if (is_updated == 0) {
+ // In an ideal world, we'd just check for hasUserValue, but we can't do
+ // that, because we set browser.startup.homepage to have a user value already...
+ m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage",
+ "https://check.torproject.org/?lang="+locale+"&small=1&uptodate=0");
+ } else if (is_updated == 1) {
+ var homepage = m_tb_prefs.getCharPref("browser.startup.homepage");
+ if (homepage.indexOf("https://check.torproject.org/") == 0) {
+ m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage",
+ "https://check.torproject.org/?lang="+locale+"&small=1&uptodate=1");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
function torbutton_reload_homepage() {
var homepage = m_tb_prefs.getComplexValue("browser.startup.homepage",
Components.interfaces.nsIPrefLocalizedString).data;
@@ -2889,22 +2914,7 @@ function torbutton_set_launch_state(state, session_restore) {
// Load our homepage again. We just killed it via the toggle.
if (!session_restore) {
- if (m_tb_tbb && m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.versioncheck_enabled")) {
- var is_updated = torbutton_check_version();
- var locale = m_tb_prefs.getCharPref("general.useragent.locale");
- if (is_updated == 0) {
- // In an ideal world, we'd just check for hasUserValue, but we can't do
- // that, because we set browser.startup.homepage to have a user value already...
- m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage",
- "https://check.torproject.org/?lang="+locale+"&small=1&uptodate=0");
- } else if (is_updated == 1) {
- var homepage = m_tb_prefs.getCharPref("browser.startup.homepage");
- if (homepage.indexOf("https://check.torproject.org/") == 0) {
- m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage",
- "https://check.torproject.org/?lang="+locale+"&small=1&uptodate=1");
- }
- }
- }
+ torbutton_do_versioncheck();
torbutton_reload_homepage();
}
} else {
@@ -2918,6 +2928,7 @@ function torbutton_set_launch_state(state, session_restore) {
// Load our homepage again. We just killed it via the toggle.
if (!session_restore) {
+ torbutton_do_version_check();
torbutton_reload_homepage();
}
}
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