October 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Fix log message about what cells we are sending
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 610cb0ecc43506d237074868050630b30d046a6d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 27 14:40:27 2011 -0400 Fix log message about what cells we are sending --- src/or/command.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index a8e68e1..5519245 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell", send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "", send_certs ? " CERTS" : "", - send_versions ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "", + send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "", send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : ""); if (send_versions) {

1 0

[tor/master] more verbose log for recording an odd cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit f726c67dd485bf67e02c12fbb04e99447e407487 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 27 14:39:57 2011 -0400 more verbose log for recording an odd cell --- src/or/connection_or.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index adaaa2c..004c19f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1608,7 +1608,8 @@ or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, packed_cell_t packed; if (!incoming) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells " - "whilemaking a handshake digest. But we think we are."); + "while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending " + "one with type %d.", (int)cell->command); } dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent; if (! *dptr)

1 0

[tor/master] Set up network parameters on non-authenticated incoming connections
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 23664fb3b8461bfdbfab403371e90b4af1b42450 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 28 13:10:40 2011 -0400 Set up network parameters on non-authenticated incoming connections Also add some info log messages for the steps of the v3 handshake. Now my test network bootstraps! --- src/or/command.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index d63b9dd..ca248e6 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -734,6 +734,21 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got a NETINFO cell from server, " "but no authentication. Closing the connection."); connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return; + } + } else { + /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have + some housekeeping to do.*/ + if (!conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( + (const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id)); + connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, NULL); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, + &conn->_base.addr, + conn->_base.port, + (const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, + 0); } } } @@ -810,13 +825,19 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) * trustworthy. */ (void)my_apparent_addr; - if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0) + if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but " + "was unable to make the OR connection become open.", + safe_str_client(conn->_base.address), + conn->_base.port); connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); - else + } else { log_info(LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now " - "open, using protocol version %d", + "open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s", safe_str_client(conn->_base.address), - conn->_base.port, (int)conn->link_proto); + conn->_base.port, (int)conn->link_proto, + hex_str(conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + } assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),time(NULL)); } @@ -930,6 +951,8 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id) < 0) ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id"); + log_info(LD_OR, "Got some good certifcates from %s:%d: Authenticated it.", + conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert; id_cert = NULL; @@ -945,6 +968,10 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1)) ERR("The ID certificate was not valid"); + + log_info(LD_OR, "Got some good certifcates from %s:%d: " + "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.", + conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); /* XXXX check more stuff? */ id_cert = auth_cert = NULL; @@ -1013,6 +1040,10 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1; if (use_type && public_server_mode(get_options())) { + log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending " + "authentication", + conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(conn, use_type) < 0) { log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send authenticate cell"); connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); @@ -1023,8 +1054,10 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); return; } + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Not authenticating", + conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); } - #undef ERR } @@ -1150,6 +1183,9 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) conn->_base.port, (const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 0); + + log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: Looks good.", + conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); } #undef ERR

1 0

[tor/master] Make sure we stop putting cells into our hash at the right time.
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 7aadae606b51460810163cac0a5e695ebbefa3b9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 28 10:31:56 2011 -0400 Make sure we stop putting cells into our hash at the right time. --- src/or/command.c | 4 +++- src/or/connection_or.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 4da5f86..d63b9dd 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -243,7 +243,8 @@ command_process_var_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) return; /*XXXX023 log*/ break; case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: - or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + if (cell->command != CELL_AUTHENTICATE) + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); break; /* Everything is allowed */ case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: if (conn->link_proto < 3) @@ -1131,6 +1132,7 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) /* Okay, we are authenticated. */ conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1; conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0; { crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(conn->handshake_state->id_cert); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 1b40f36..7cdea82 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1573,6 +1573,8 @@ connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here) or_handshake_state_t *s; s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t)); s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0; + s->digest_sent_data = 1; + s->digest_received_data = 1; return 0; } @@ -1606,6 +1608,13 @@ or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, { crypto_digest_env_t *d, **dptr; packed_cell_t packed; + if (incoming) { + if (!state->digest_received_data) + return; + } else { + if (!state->digest_sent_data) + return; + } if (!incoming) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells " "while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending " @@ -1638,6 +1647,13 @@ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, { crypto_digest_env_t *d, **dptr; char buf[VAR_CELL_HEADER_SIZE]; + if (incoming) { + if (!state->digest_received_data) + return; + } else { + if (!state->digest_sent_data) + return; + } dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent; if (! *dptr) *dptr = crypto_new_digest256_env(DIGEST_SHA256); @@ -1891,6 +1907,8 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn) int len; uint8_t *out; + tor_assert(conn->handshake_state); + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); cell.command = CELL_NETINFO; @@ -1917,6 +1935,7 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn) *out = 0; } + conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0; connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn); return 0; diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 887dcb6..aa12e31 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1145,6 +1145,19 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t { /* True iff we've received valid authentication to some identity. */ unsigned int authenticated : 1; + /** True iff we should feed outgoing cells into digest_sent and + * digest_received respectively. + * + * From the server's side of the v3 handshake, we want to capture everything + * from the VERSIONS cell through and including the AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. + * From the client's, we want to capture everything from the VERSIONS cell + * through but *not* including the AUTHENTICATE cell. + * + * @{ */ + unsigned int digest_sent_data : 1; + unsigned int digest_received_data : 1; + /**@}*/ + /** Identity digest that we have received and authenticated for our peer * on this connection. */ uint8_t authenticated_peer_id[DIGEST_LEN];

1 0

[tor/master] Bugfixes for authenticate handling and generation
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 41b250d7ea6b2d635d0e0b70cf7e1d5c1ed9ca4f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 27 15:20:17 2011 -0400 Bugfixes for authenticate handling and generation --- src/or/command.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 5519245..4da5f86 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake"); if (conn->link_proto < 3) ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); - if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here) + if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) ERR("We originated this connection"); if (conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate) ERR("We already got one!"); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 004c19f..1b40f36 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -2163,6 +2163,7 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype) 16 /* just in case XXXX */ ; cell = var_cell_new(cell_maxlen); + cell->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE; set_uint16(cell->payload, htons(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)); /* skip over length ; we don't know that yet. */

1 0

[tor/master] Make more safe_str usage happen for new logs in command.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit ce102f7a59eb286b18d5f7522467aa152bff7e82 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 28 13:19:55 2011 -0400 Make more safe_str usage happen for new logs in command.c --- src/or/command.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index ca248e6..91486c1 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) do { \ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ "Received a bad CERT cell from %s:%d: %s", \ - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \ + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port, (s)); \ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \ goto err; \ } while (0) @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (!cert) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Received undecodable certificate in CERT cell from %s:%d", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); } else { if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK && !link_cert) link_cert = cert; @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id"); log_info(LD_OR, "Got some good certifcates from %s:%d: Authenticated it.", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert; id_cert = NULL; @@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) log_info(LD_OR, "Got some good certifcates from %s:%d: " "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); /* XXXX check more stuff? */ id_cert = auth_cert = NULL; @@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) do { \ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ "Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \ + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port, (s)); \ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \ return; \ } while (0) @@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (use_type && public_server_mode(get_options())) { log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending " "authentication", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(conn, use_type) < 0) { log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send authenticate cell"); @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) } } else { log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Not authenticating", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); } #undef ERR } @@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) do { \ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ "Received a bad AUTHETNICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \ + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port, (s)); \ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \ return; \ } while (0) @@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) 0); log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: Looks good.", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); + safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); } #undef ERR

1 0

[tor/master] Remove auth_challenge field from or_handshake_state_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 059d3d06132048135bd45a1ecf23a62731b3a8cc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 6 14:41:02 2011 -0400 Remove auth_challenge field from or_handshake_state_t We didn't need to record this value; it was already recorded implicitly while computing cell digests for later examination in the authenticate cells. --- src/or/command.c | 3 --- src/or/or.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 3bd6dd7..7efd18f 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -1043,9 +1043,6 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types) ERR("It looks truncated"); - memcpy(conn->handshake_state->auth_challenge, cell->payload, - OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN); - /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */ cp=cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN+2; for (i=0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index aa12e31..7268ae6 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1162,9 +1162,6 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t { * on this connection. */ uint8_t authenticated_peer_id[DIGEST_LEN]; - /** DOCDOC */ - uint8_t auth_challenge[OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN]; - /** Digests of the cells that we have sent or received as part of a V3 * handshake. Used for making and checking AUTHENTICATE cells. *

1 0

[tor/master] Give tor_cert_get_id_digests() fail-fast behavior
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit e56d7a3809611e85b48474f27b3feb461e82e109 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 5 10:33:39 2011 -0400 Give tor_cert_get_id_digests() fail-fast behavior Right now we can take the digests only of an RSA key, and only expect to take the digests of an RSA key. The old tor_cert_get_id_digests() would return a good set of digests for an RSA key, and an all-zero one for a non-RSA key. This behavior is too error-prone: it carries the risk that we will someday check two non-RSA keys for equality and conclude that they must be equal because they both have the same (zero) "digest". Instead, let's have tor_cert_get_id_digests() return NULL for keys we can't handle, and make its callers explicitly test for NULL. --- src/common/tortls.c | 10 ++++++++-- src/or/command.c | 9 ++++++++- src/or/connection_or.c | 11 ++++++++--- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 247e9ee..9600464 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct tor_cert_t { X509 *cert; uint8_t *encoded; size_t encoded_len; + unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1; digests_t cert_digests; digests_t pkey_digests; }; @@ -734,6 +735,7 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert) (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { crypto_pk_env_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa); crypto_pk_get_all_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests); + cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; crypto_free_pk_env(pk); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } @@ -794,11 +796,15 @@ tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert, *size_out = cert->encoded_len; } -/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert. */ +/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert, or NULL if this + * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */ const digests_t * tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert) { - return &cert->pkey_digests; + if (cert->pkey_digests_set) + return &cert->pkey_digests; + else + return NULL; } /** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert. */ diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 91486c1..c1e2f5e 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -939,8 +939,12 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; { - crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); + crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd; + if (!id_digests) + ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert"); + + identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd); @@ -1172,6 +1176,9 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert); + /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */ + tor_assert(id_digests); + memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 7cdea82..a5b965b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -2060,12 +2060,17 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn, { const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL; + const digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests; const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id; if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert, &id_cert)) return -1; - my_id = (uint8_t*)tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; - their_id = (uint8_t*) - tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; + my_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); + their_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert); + tor_assert(my_digests); + tor_assert(their_digests); + my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; + their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; + client_id = server ? their_id : my_id; server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;

1 0

[tor/master] Fix some more issues wrt tor_cert_new found by asn
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit 40f0d111c2263b44d30d47a292b3bb9ef3a01a08 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 5 10:25:42 2011 -0400 Fix some more issues wrt tor_cert_new found by asn --- src/common/tortls.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 206ac3b..247e9ee 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -706,9 +706,13 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert) tor_cert_t *cert; EVP_PKEY *pkey; RSA *rsa; - int length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, NULL), length2; + int length, length2; unsigned char *cp; + if (!x509_cert) + return NULL; + + length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, NULL); cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t)); if (length <= 0) { tor_free(cert); @@ -766,7 +770,6 @@ tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) } newcert = tor_cert_new(x509); if (!newcert) { - X509_free(x509); return NULL; } if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len || @@ -1118,6 +1121,8 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) result->my_link_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(cert)); result->my_id_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert)); result->my_auth_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert)); + if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert) + goto error; result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa); result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);

1 0

[tor/master] spec conformance: allow only one cert of each type
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Oct '11

10 Oct '11

commit d79ff2ce94ac1e0e4938517403f29c4e9aaf799c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 5 10:44:22 2011 -0400 spec conformance: allow only one cert of each type --- src/or/command.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index c1e2f5e..3bd6dd7 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -908,14 +908,27 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) "Received undecodable certificate in CERT cell from %s:%d", safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port); } else { - if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK && !link_cert) + if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK) { + if (link_cert) { + tor_cert_free(cert); + ERR("Too many TLS_LINK certificates"); + } link_cert = cert; - else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 && !id_cert) + } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024) { + if (id_cert) { + tor_cert_free(cert); + ERR("Too many ID_1024 certificates"); + } id_cert = cert; - else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 && !auth_cert) + } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) { + if (auth_cert) { + tor_cert_free(cert); + ERR("Too many AUTH_1024 certificates"); + } auth_cert = cert; - else + } else { tor_cert_free(cert); + } } } ptr += 3 + cert_len;

1 0