On 2017-02-21 06:30, isabela@riseup.net wrote:
Hello TBB team! and Linda ;)
I would like to ask your feedback on some feature decisions we have to make for Tor Launcher.
We got fund to work on improving Tor Launcher user experience.
Yay!
We are going to use Linda's paper as our reference on how we will go about that. We might add some new things on the top of the suggestions she makes on her paper, I know Linda herself has some stuff she wants to consider that is not there.
:)
But! This email is a question on a more specific thing, a question that comes out whenever one talks about Tor Launcher is 'why not automate it?'.
The quick answer is, "we might be able to do just as well without automation, and if we can, we should!" And that they should let us try.
And our sponsors are asking us that exactly question. I am in favor of making it easier for the user that will prefer not to deal with settings, but I am also a big fan on making sure our users are safe. As I believe you all are!
Our sponsors are asking for the PT selection part of the launcher to be automated. For us to test the user network and figure out the best solution to get the user connected to the Tor network - we could leave an option for those users who would prefer to go through settings and configure it as they will.
That said, Linda has specific design considerations that lead her to decide against that because of user security.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorLauncherUX2016#Designco...
Another thing to consider is that we this will already obtain enormous gains with the improvements we will be doing at the Tor Launcher step, even without this automation piece.
Linda's paper shows that.
So, I would prefer we don't base this decision on 'gains' for Tor (of course automation will increase metrics is the easiest growth hack trick) but to base it on the user and their security.
What we are looking for here is feedback on those points on 'design considerations' to make sure we are not missing anything here.
Does the threats there has enough weight for us to not consider automation? Does anyone think different or has other points we are not considering?
I'm certainly discouraging moving it from what it is now straight to an automated thing, because I think that's going to take time to implement such a thing and we can help people a LOT just by making design changes. I think this is what you should emphasize.
I think we can have WAYYYY better design than what I have in my paper, too. If I could redesign it now, I'd try to: 1) put everything on one screen (like how it is in the browser, if you go to connection settings), 2) simplify even more, 3) give advice that doesn't require inputs (i.e. "try using X if you are in countries a,b,c").
Something that also isn't automated is asking something like "you are about to make a connection to Tor. is this okay?" or give options like "connect" and "connect with extra caution (this may be slower)"--and this can be the difference between a direct connection or use an unlisted bridge running some obfuscation protocol.
I think that the threats there are not necessarily enough to deter us from automation. My point in the paper is that automation is not as simple as people think, and that this needs to be done carefully. With proper tone, consent, and miscellaneous things (user education, SEO-ing official tor mirrors, etc.), automation can be done.
I think we can get it to be ALMOST as easy as automation if we design it right, though. And if we can, then we should do that instead. I have no evidence to support that case, but that's my two cents. We can even test the new design against automation (i.e. just compare it to a 100% success rate and how many seconds it would take to connect with an automated process).
We would like feedback on this soon as we have a deadline (March 3rd) to decide on what to do about this feature request.
Thanks! Isabela
ps: Linda is updating her paper once that is done we will share with y'all o/
Re: P.S.: I'm making changes to it for PETS until the end of Feb, and the camera ready is due end of March, so the finalized version will be available at the end of march. I've put my current version of the paper on a private repo because someone on the PC told me I should.