[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Jun 17 18:20:10 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/24 ===
===========================================================================
version 41
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-06-17T17:30:27+00:00
small fix
--- version 40
+++ version 41
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
use-cases are, in a way that does not endanger its users, is far from
being a trivial problem.
-There has been some cases of inconsiderate spying on Tor network users
+There have been some cases of inconsiderate spying on Tor network users
in the past [4]. This is one of the motivations for the Tor Project to
provide and research properly anonymized statistics through the
Metrics [5] and CollecTor [6] portals.
version 40
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-06-17T17:26:57+00:00
remove extra spaces
--- version 39
+++ version 40
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
Following up on his earlier promise [21], Karsten Loesing shut down [22]
the Tor Metrics portal’s relay-search service, and in doing so reduced
-the size of the metrics database from 95 gigabytes to a mere 3. “If the
+the size of the metrics database from 95 gigabytes to a mere 3. “If the
metrics website shows you funny numbers in the next couple of days,
please let me know”, wrote Karsten.
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
just a proof of concept. Don’t depend on this […] Ideally Tor would be
integrated with Firefox OS so that you can start and stop it as a
service and maybe whitelist or blacklist sites that should and shouldn’t
-use Tor. I hope to do some of this over time or hope someone else gets
+use Tor. I hope to do some of this over time or hope someone else gets
excited enough to work on it too.”
[34]: http://bluishcoder.co.nz/2014/06/12/using-tor-with-firefox-os.html
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
browser window size has been set to a multiple of 100 pixels according
to the detected screen resolution. Taskbars in the user workspace making
selecting an appropriate window size slightly more complicated though;
-more details are available on the bug’s ticket [35].
+more details are available on the bug’s ticket [35].
[35]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9268
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
user1747 often visits web sites which provide their services both within
the visible web and as a hidden service (DuckDuckGo might serve as an
-example). Does the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) automatically switch to a
+example). Does the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) automatically switch to a
hidden service in this case [38]? mirimir explained that there is no
connection between DNS and the names of hidden services, so TBB doesn’t
know about this hidden service and can’t connect automatically. user2949
version 39
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-06-17T17:23:34+00:00
freeze
--- version 38
+++ version 39
@@ -15,51 +15,52 @@
Tails 1.0.1 is out
------------------
-The Tails developers announced [XXX] the first point release in the
-Tails 1.0 series, following their decision [XXX] to postpone the release
-of Tails 1.1 (which will be based on Wheezy, the latest stable version
-of Debian).
+The Tails developers announced [1] the first point release in the Tails
+1.0 series, following their decision [2] to postpone the release of
+Tails 1.1 (which will be based on Wheezy, the latest stable version of
+Debian).
This release contains no major new features, but does fix numerous
-security issues [XXX] present in 1.0, so all Tails users should upgrade
-as soon as possible.
-
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_1.0.1/
- [XXX]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-May/005917.html
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_1.0/index
+security issues [3] present in 1.0, so all Tails users should upgrade as
+soon as possible.
+
+ [1]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_1.0.1/
+ [2]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-May/005917.html
+ [3]: https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_1.0/index
Collecting statistics from Tor exits in a privacy-sensitive manner
------------------------------------------------------------------
Optimizing the Tor network to better support the most common use-cases
could make a real difference to its perceived usability. Unfortunately,
-Tor is an anonymity network. Understanding what the most common use-cases
-are, in a way that does not endanger its users, is far from being a
-trivial problem.
+Tor is an anonymity network. Understanding what the most common
+use-cases are, in a way that does not endanger its users, is far from
+being a trivial problem.
There has been some cases of inconsiderate spying on Tor network users
-in the past [XXX]. This is one of the motivations for the Tor Project to
+in the past [4]. This is one of the motivations for the Tor Project to
provide and research properly anonymized statistics through the
-Metrics [XXX] and CollecTor [XXX] portals.
+Metrics [5] and CollecTor [6] portals.
Tariq Elahi, George Danezis, and Ian Goldberg are working on new
solutions to tackle the problem of collecting statistics from Tor exits
-in a privacy-sensitive manner. Tariq announced [XXX] the PrivEx system
+in a privacy-sensitive manner. Tariq announced [7] the PrivEx system
which “preserves the security and privacy properties of anonymous
communication networks, even in the face of adversaries that can
compromise data collection nodes or coerce operators to reveal
cryptographic secrets and keys”.
-The introduction of the detailed tech [XXX] report gives a general description
-of the solution: “PrivEx collects aggregated statistics to provide
-insights about user behaviour trends by recording aggregate usage of the
-anonymity network. To further reduce the risk of inadvertent
-disclosures, it collects only information about destinations that appear
-in a list of known censored websites. The aggregate statistics are
-themselves collected and collated in a privacy-friendly manner using
-secure multiparty computation primitives, enhanced and tuned to resist a
-variety of compulsion attacks and compromises. Finally, the granularity
-of the statistics is reduced […] to foil correlation attacks.”
+The introduction of the detailed tech [8] report gives a general
+description of the solution: “PrivEx collects aggregated statistics to
+provide insights about user behaviour trends by recording aggregate
+usage of the anonymity network. To further reduce the risk of
+inadvertent disclosures, it collects only information about destinations
+that appear in a list of known censored websites. The aggregate
+statistics are themselves collected and collated in a privacy-friendly
+manner using secure multiparty computation primitives, enhanced and
+tuned to resist a variety of compulsion attacks and compromises.
+Finally, the granularity of the statistics is reduced […] to foil
+correlation attacks.”
PrivEx’s threat model is described in section 3, and matches the current
mode of operation of the Tor network, relying on a set of mostly honest
@@ -74,145 +75,148 @@
described in the tech report have been created and should soon be
released to the community. The researchers expect to “start by rolling
out our own PrivEx-enabled exits in the Tor network and begin collecting
-destination visit statistics” around the “June-August timeframe”. Section
-6 contains an analysis of the overhead in both CPU and bandwidth of the
-two PrivEx variants, and the requirements seem reasonable.
-
-Given how much privacy matters to the Tor community and to all network users,
-the researchers wants “a measure of confidence that collecting data with
-PrivEx is inherently good and is being done in a responsible and
-intelligent manner”. They are therefore asking the “community at large”
-to review the design of the proposal, and its implementation once
+destination visit statistics” around the “June-August timeframe”.
+Section 6 contains an analysis of the overhead in both CPU and bandwidth
+of the two PrivEx variants, and the requirements seem reasonable.
+
+Given how much privacy matters to the Tor community and to all network
+users, the researchers wants “a measure of confidence that collecting
+data with PrivEx is inherently good and is being done in a responsible
+and intelligent manner”. They are therefore asking the “community at
+large” to review the design of the proposal, and its implementation once
released.
If no fundamental flaws are discovered in the process, the Tor community
might finally be able to enjoy better network statistics in the
not-too-distant future.
- [XXX]: http://www.ifca.ai/pub/fc11/wecsr11/soghoian.pdf
- [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/
- [XXX]: https://collector.torproject.org/
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006999.html
- [XXX]: http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2014/cacr2014-08.pdf
+ [4]: http://www.ifca.ai/pub/fc11/wecsr11/soghoian.pdf
+ [5]: https://metrics.torproject.org/
+ [6]: https://collector.torproject.org/
+ [7]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006999.html
+ [8]: http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2014/cacr2014-08.pdf
Upcoming developments in pluggable transports
---------------------------------------------
-In a new blog post [XXX], George Kadianakis reported on some recent
-pluggable transports [XXX] developments. Some — like the release of
-Tor Browser 3.6 [XXX], the deprecation of obfs2 [XXX], the new meek
-transport [XXX], or the recently-written “Child’s Garden Of Pluggable
-Transports” guide [XXX] should already be known to regular readers of
-Tor Weekly News.
+In a new blog post [9], George Kadianakis reported on some recent
+pluggable transports [10] developments. Some — like the release of Tor
+Browser 3.6 [11], the deprecation of obfs2 [12], the new meek
+transport [13], or the recently-written “Child’s Garden Of Pluggable
+Transports” guide [14] should already be known to regular readers of Tor
+Weekly News.
It was previously impossible to use pluggable transports at the same
-time as an HTTP or SOCKS proxy. The release of Tor Browser 3.6.2 [XXX]
-is the first to include work by Yawning Angel which solves this
-deficiency.
-
-However, ScrambleSuit, released last winter, has not yet been included in
-Tor Browser. The pluggable transport team is considering skipping
-its deployment in favor of a new protocol, dubbed “obfs4” [XXX],
-which is “like ScrambleSuit (with regards to features and threat model),
-but it’s faster and autofixes some of the open issues”.
-
-George also mentions that enabling pluggable transports to work over IPv6
-is on the team’s radar. As advanced deep packet inspection (DPI) on IPv6 is
-less common, it should buy some more time for users on censored networks.
-
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-and-upcoming-developments-pluggable-transports
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-36-released
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-362-released
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/232-pluggable-transports-through-proxy.txt
- [XXX]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfs4
+time as an HTTP or SOCKS proxy. The release of Tor Browser 3.6.2 [15] is
+the first to include work by Yawning Angel which solves this deficiency.
+
+However, ScrambleSuit, released last winter, has not yet been included
+in Tor Browser. The pluggable transport team is considering skipping its
+deployment in favor of a new protocol, dubbed “obfs4” [16], which is
+“like ScrambleSuit (with regards to features and threat model), but it’s
+faster and autofixes some of the open issues”.
+
+George also mentions that enabling pluggable transports to work over
+IPv6 is on the team’s radar. As advanced deep packet inspection (DPI) on
+IPv6 is less common, it should buy some more time for users on censored
+networks.
+
+ [9]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-and-upcoming-developments-pluggable-transports
+ [10]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html
+ [11]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-36-released
+ [12]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314
+ [13]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
+ [14]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-362-released
+ [15]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/232-pluggable-transports-through-proxy.txt
+ [16]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfs4
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-David Fifield updated [XXX] the experimental Tor Browser builds that include the meek
-pluggable transport [XXX]. The new packages are based on Tor Browser version 3.6.2.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033229.html
- [XXX]: https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.6.2-meek-1/
-
-meejah announced [XXX] a new release of txtorcon — a Twisted-based
-asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Version 0.10.0 adds
-support for Twisted’s endpoint strings. meejah explains: “this means that
-ANY Twisted program that uses endpoints can accept ‘onion:’ strings to
-bring up a hidden services easily […]. Typically, no code changes to
-the application should be needed […].”
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007006.html
-
-The Tails team reported [XXX] progress on code, documentation, infrastructure, discussions,
-funding, and outreach matters for May. The report also mentions Tails’ position regarding
-the discontinuation of TrueCrypt.
-
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/report_2014_05/
-
-Following up on his earlier promise [XXX], Karsten Loesing shut
-down [XXX] the Tor Metrics portal’s relay-search service, and in doing so
-reduced the size of the metrics database from 95 gigabytes to a mere 3.
-“If the metrics website shows you funny numbers in the next couple of days,
+David Fifield updated [17] the experimental Tor Browser builds that
+include the meek pluggable transport [18]. The new packages are based on
+Tor Browser version 3.6.2.
+
+ [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033229.html
+ [18]: https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.6.2-meek-1/
+
+meejah announced [19] a new release of txtorcon — a Twisted-based
+asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Version 0.10.0 adds
+support for Twisted’s endpoint strings. meejah explains: “this means
+that ANY Twisted program that uses endpoints can accept ‘onion:’ strings
+to bring up a hidden services easily […]. Typically, no code changes to
+the application should be needed […].”
+
+ [19]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007006.html
+
+The Tails team reported [20] progress on code, documentation,
+infrastructure, discussions, funding, and outreach matters for May. The
+report also mentions Tails’ position regarding the discontinuation of
+TrueCrypt.
+
+ [20]: https://tails.boum.org/news/report_2014_05/
+
+Following up on his earlier promise [21], Karsten Loesing shut down [22]
+the Tor Metrics portal’s relay-search service, and in doing so reduced
+the size of the metrics database from 95 gigabytes to a mere 3. “If the
+metrics website shows you funny numbers in the next couple of days,
please let me know”, wrote Karsten.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-December/005948.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007007.html
-
-Andrew Lewman reported [XXX] on his activities for May. Sebastian G. subsequently
-opened two discussions on the tor-talk mailing list [XXX]: one regarding the
-challenges of integrating Tor into millions of products [XXX] and another on
-how US legislation is preventing the Tor Project, Inc. from receiving donations
-from certain countries [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-June/000563.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033254.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033255.html
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-December/005948.html
+ [22]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007007.html
+
+Andrew Lewman reported [23] on his activities for May. Sebastian G.
+subsequently opened two discussions on the tor-talk mailing list [24]:
+one regarding the challenges of integrating Tor into millions of
+products [25] and another on how US legislation is preventing the Tor
+Project, Inc. from receiving donations from certain countries [26].
+
+ [23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-June/000563.html
+ [24]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
+ [25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033254.html
+ [26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033255.html
Several GSoC students reported on the progress of their projects: Kostas
-Jakeliunas on the BridgeDB Twitter distributor [XXX], Juha Nurmi for
-ahmia.fi [XXX], and Zack Mullaly on the HTTPS Everywhere secure ruleset update
-mechanism [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006988.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-June/000562.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/https-everywhere/2014-June/002128.html
-
-Lukas Erlacher has released OnionPy 0.1.5 [XXX]. “If you are planning to
+Jakeliunas on the BridgeDB Twitter distributor [27], Juha Nurmi for
+ahmia.fi [28], and Zack Mullaly on the HTTPS Everywhere secure ruleset
+update mechanism [29].
+
+ [27]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006988.html
+ [28]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-June/000562.html
+ [29]: https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/https-everywhere/2014-June/002128.html
+
+Lukas Erlacher has released OnionPy 0.1.5 [30]. “If you are planning to
make something in python that uses the tor network status, accessing
-Onionoo [XXX] using OnionPy might be exactly what you need”, Lukas wrote.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007018.html
- [XXX]: https://onionoo.torproject.org/
-
-The Tails developers suggested [XXX] that Tails translation teams using
+Onionoo [31] using OnionPy might be exactly what you need”, Lukas wrote.
+
+ [30]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/007018.html
+ [31]: https://onionoo.torproject.org/
+
+The Tails developers suggested [32] that Tails translation teams using
git, rather than the online Transifex platform, should begin signing
their email pull requests with OpenPGP keys, to ensure that the process
is not open to exploitation.
- [XXX]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-l10n/2014-June/001293.html
+ [32]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-l10n/2014-June/001293.html
Drupal.org, the main website for the development community around the
free and open-source web platform Drupal, subscribes to a blacklist that
includes Tor exit nodes, making it difficult for Tor users to interact
-with the site. AohRveTPV explained the problem [XXX], and asked for “ideas
-on how to actually achieve better Drupal.org support for Tor users”.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033250.html
-
-Chris Double described [XXX] a detailed but experimental method for using
-Tor with Firefox OS, the mobile operating system from Mozilla. “This
-is just a proof of concept. Don’t depend on this […] Ideally Tor would be
-integrated with Firefox OS so that you can start and stop it as a service
-and maybe whitelist or blacklist sites that should and shouldn’t use Tor.
-I hope to do some of this over time or hope someone else gets excited enough
-to work on it too.”
-
- [XXX]: http://bluishcoder.co.nz/2014/06/12/using-tor-with-firefox-os.html
+with the site. AohRveTPV explained the problem [33], and asked for
+“ideas on how to actually achieve better Drupal.org support for Tor
+users”.
+
+ [33]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033250.html
+
+Chris Double described [34] a detailed but experimental method for using
+Tor with Firefox OS, the mobile operating system from Mozilla. “This is
+just a proof of concept. Don’t depend on this […] Ideally Tor would be
+integrated with Firefox OS so that you can start and stop it as a
+service and maybe whitelist or blacklist sites that should and shouldn’t
+use Tor. I hope to do some of this over time or hope someone else gets
+excited enough to work on it too.”
+
+ [34]: http://bluishcoder.co.nz/2014/06/12/using-tor-with-firefox-os.html
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
@@ -222,34 +226,34 @@
browser window size has been set to a multiple of 100 pixels according
to the detected screen resolution. Taskbars in the user workspace making
selecting an appropriate window size slightly more complicated though;
-more details are available on the bug’s ticket [XXX].
-
-[XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9268
+more details are available on the bug’s ticket [35].
+
+ [35]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9268
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-bk201 found some random-looking domain names in the logs of some
-network software. These connection attempts disappeared when Tor was
-closed [XXX], so bk201 wants to know what they are. Lunar explained
-that they are requests for non-existent domain names. Tor wants to
-find out if some DNS servers send fake answers. This feature was
-added in 2007 [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3324/88
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/ReleaseNotes#l6663
-
-user1747 often visits web sites which provide their services both within the
-visible web and as a hidden service (DuckDuckGo might serve as an example).
-Does the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) automatically switch to a hidden service
-in this case [XXX]? mirimir explained that there is no connection between
-DNS and the names of hidden services, so TBB doesn’t know about this
-hidden service and can’t connect automatically. user2949 pointed to a
-plugin [XXX], similar to HTTPS Everywhere, that forwards a request to
-a hidden service if it is available.
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3262/88
- [XXX]: https://github.com/chris-barry/darkweb-everywhere
+bk201 found some random-looking domain names in the logs of some network
+software. These connection attempts disappeared when Tor was
+closed [36], so bk201 wants to know what they are. Lunar explained that
+they are requests for non-existent domain names. Tor wants to find out
+if some DNS servers send fake answers. This feature was added in
+2007 [37].
+
+ [36]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3324/88
+ [37]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/ReleaseNotes#l6663
+
+user1747 often visits web sites which provide their services both within
+the visible web and as a hidden service (DuckDuckGo might serve as an
+example). Does the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) automatically switch to a
+hidden service in this case [38]? mirimir explained that there is no
+connection between DNS and the names of hidden services, so TBB doesn’t
+know about this hidden service and can’t connect automatically. user2949
+pointed to a plugin [39], similar to HTTPS Everywhere, that forwards a
+request to a hidden service if it is available.
+
+ [38]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3262/88
+ [39]: https://github.com/chris-barry/darkweb-everywhere
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -276,10 +280,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [40], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [41] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [40]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [41]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
version 38
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-06-17T17:18:30+00:00
remove duplicate link
--- version 37
+++ version 38
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@
not-too-distant future.
[XXX]: http://www.ifca.ai/pub/fc11/wecsr11/soghoian.pdf
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006999.html
[XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/
[XXX]: https://collector.torproject.org/
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006999.html
version 37
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-06-17T17:11:56+00:00
add credits
--- version 36
+++ version 37
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@
| https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2014SummerDevMeeting
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by harmony, Lunar, the
+Tails developers, Matt Pagan, Karsten Loesing, and qbi.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
--
Your friendly TWN monitoring script
In case of malfunction, please reach out for lunar at torproject.org
or for the worst cases, tell weasel at torproject.org to kill me.
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