[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Wed Apr 16 08:20:06 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/15 ===
===========================================================================
version 45
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-16T07:40:23+00:00
one more nit
--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
------------------
CVE-2014-0160 prompted Anthony Basile to release version 20140409 [25]
-of Tor-ramdisk. OpenSSL has been updated and so was the kernel.
+of Tor-ramdisk. OpenSSL has been updated and so has the kernel.
Upgrading is strongly recommended.
[25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-April/032642.html
version 44
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-16T07:38:59+00:00
small changes
--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
New beta version of Tor Browser 3.6
-----------------------------------
-The second beta release of the next major Tor Browser release [1] is
+The second beta version of the next major Tor Browser release [1] is
out. Version 3.6 main highlight is the seamless integration of pluggable
transports [2] in the browser.
@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@
---------------------------
The “Heartbleed” issue forces system administrators to consider private
-keys of network facing application affected by the bug as compromised.
+keys of network-facing applications affected by the bug as compromised.
As Tor has no shortage of private keys in its design [5], a serious
-amount of new keys have to be generated.
+number of new keys has to be generated.
Roger Dingledine prompted relay operators to get new identity keys,
-“especially from the big relays, and we'll be happier tolerating a
+“especially from the big relays, and we’ll be happier tolerating a
couple of bumpy days while the network recovers.” [6]. Switching to a
new relay identity key means that the relay is seen as new [7] to the
authorities again: they will lose their Guard status and bandwidth
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@
the network lost around 1 Gbit/s of advertised capacity between April
7th and April 10th [8].
-For a brighter future if such massive RSA1024 relay key migration was in
-order, Nick Mathewson wrote proposal 230 [9]. The proposal describes a
-mechanism for relays to advertise their old identity to directory
-authorities and clients.
-
-Directory authorities can currently tie relay's nickname to its identity
-key with the Named flag. That feature proved to be less helpful than it
-seemed and can subject its users to impersonation attacks. As relays
-switch to new identity keys, those who keep the same name will lose
-their Named flag for the next six months. So now seems a good time to
-“throw out the Named and Unnamed flags entirely” [10]. Sebastian Hahn
+For a brighter future if such massive RSA1024 relay key migration is
+ever again in order, Nick Mathewson wrote proposal 230 [9]. The proposal
+describes a mechanism for relays to advertise their old identity to
+directory authorities and clients.
+
+Directory authorities can currently tie a relay’s nickname to its
+identity key with the Named flag. That feature proved to be less helpful
+than it seemed, and can subject its users to impersonation attacks. As
+relays switch to new identity keys, those who keep the same name will
+lose their Named flag for the next six months. So now seems a good time
+to “throw out the Named and Unnamed flags entirely” [10]. Sebastian Hahn
acted on the idea and started a draft proposal [11].
How should potentially compromised relays which have not switched to a
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@
exits [14]. To protect Tor users, directory authority operators have
started to reject descriptors for vulnerable relays [15].
-The identity key for directory authorities are kept offline. But they
-are used to certify medium-term signing keys. Roger Dingledine's
+The identity keys for directory authorities are kept offline. But they
+are used to certify medium-term signing keys. Roger Dingledine’s
analysis [16] reports “two (moria1 and urras) of the directory
authorities were unaffected by the openssl bug, and seven were
affected”.
-At the time of writing, five of the seven affected authorities got new
+At the time of writing, five of the seven affected authorities had new
signing keys. In the meantime, Nick and Andrea have been busy writing
code to prevent the old keys from being accepted by Tor clients [17].
@@ -122,10 +122,10 @@
The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
month of March continued, with submissions from Andrew Lewman [20],
-Roger Dingledine [21], Kelley Misata [22].
-
-Roger also sent out the report for SponsorF [23], and the Tails team on
-its progress [24].
+Roger Dingledine [21], and Kelley Misata [22].
+
+Roger also sent out the report for SponsorF [23], and the Tails team
+reported on its progress [24].
[20]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000505.html
[21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000507.html
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
The Tails developers announced [28] that Tchou’s proposal is the winner
of the recent Tails logo contest: “in the coming days we will keep on
-fine-tuning it and integrating it in time for Tails 1.0. So don't
+fine-tuning it and integrating it in time for Tails 1.0. So don’t
hesitate to comment on it.”
[28]: https://tails.boum.org/news/and_the_winner_is/
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@
[34]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2014-April/000541.html
Arlo Breault announced [35] the release of Bulb [36], a Tor relay web
-status dashboard. “There's not much to it yet, but I thought I'd
+status dashboard. “There’s not much to it yet, but I thought I’d
share […] Contributions welcome!”
[35]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006661.html
@@ -203,15 +203,15 @@
---------------------------
Jack Gundo uses Windows 7 with the built-in firewall and wants to block
-all traffic except Tor traffic [39]. Guest suggested that on a closed
-source system one can never be sure to block really all traffic. So the
-original poster might be better off using a router which does the job.
-Another possible solution is PeerBlock. It also allows to block all
-traffic from a machine.
+all traffic except Tor traffic [39]. Guest suggested that on a
+closed-source system one can never be sure that all traffic really is
+blocked, so the original poster might be better off using a router which
+does the job. Another possible solution is PeerBlock, which also allows
+you to block all traffic from a machine.
[39]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1882/88
-Broot uses obfs3 to route the OpenVPN traffic and can't get obfsproxy
+Broot uses obfs3 to route OpenVPN traffic and can’t get obfsproxy
running because the latest version only implements SOCKS4 [40]. Yawning
Angel answered that version 0.2.7 of obfsproxy uses SOCKS5 and works
with OpenVPN. However there is a bug that needs to be worked
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