[TWN team] Updates to the wiki pages

Lunar lunar at torproject.org
Tue Sep 3 10:05:04 UTC 2013 

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CHANGED: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/9
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--- @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 08:05:02 +0000
+++ @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 10:05:04 +0000
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 ========================================================================
 
 Welcome to the tenth issue of Tor Weekly News, the weekly newsletter
-that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+that covers what is happening in the “unruhig” Tor community.
 
 Serious network overload
 ------------------------
@@ -46,10 +46,9 @@
 make them less a burden for the network, and should help the network to
 function despite being overloaded by circuit creations.
 
-Sathya and Isis both reported the patch to help their relay return to a
-more acceptable load level. Nick Mathewson pointed a few issues in the
-current implementation [XXX] but overall it looks like a band-aid good
-enough for the time being.
+Sathya and Isis both reported the patch to work. Nick Mathewson pointed
+a few issues in the current implementation [XXX] but overall it looks
+like a band-aid good enough for the time being.
 
 [XXX] https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2013-08
 -15&end=2013-09-02#direct-users
@@ -72,48 +71,33 @@
 Sherr, and Paul Syverson describe their experiments on traffic correlation attac
 ks.
 
-The author concludes with the following: “Our results do suggest that
-current users of Tor should carefully consider if it meets their
-security needs. In particular, users facing persistant adversaries who
-might run relays or monitor network traffic should be aware of the
-threat of traffic correlation. While improved defenses are still being
-developed, such users may be able to take defensive measures on their
-own. For example, they can choose to limit which relays their client
-will select using man- ual configuration options (EntryNodes, ExitNodes,
-ExcludeNodes, etc.). While this does break the uniformity of path
-selection among clients, that may be a worthwhile risk tradeoff for
-these users.”
-
-How these results impact the current Tor network has been quickly
-summarized by Roger Dingledine [XXX]: “Yes, a big enough adversary can
-screw Tor users. But we knew that. I think it's great that the paper
-presents the dual risks of relay adversaries and link adversaries, since
-most of the time when people are freaking out about one of them they're
-forgetting the other one. And we really should raise the guard rotation
-period. If you do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated
-every nine months, they look way different."
-
-The tricky thing about raising guard rotation period [XXX] is simple:
-how do we keep clients properly balanced to match the guard
-capacities? [XXX]
-
-It is also probably another signal for any Tails supporter
-that wish to help implementing guard persistence [XXX]. In any cases,
-the paper is a worth reading and any serious Tor enthusiast
-with keep in mind the very last words from the paper: “Despite our
-pessimistic results, Tor has provided real and valuable privacy to
-thousands of users. We are optimistic that it can continue and improve
-this service.”
-
-(All citations are coming from the aforementioned paper, unless
-specified otherwise.)
+This research paper follows on a long series of earlier research papers
+to better understand how Tor is vulnerable to adversaries controlling
+portions of the Tor network or monitoring users and relays at the
+network level.
+
+Roger Dingledine [XXX] wrote to tor-talk readers: “Yes, a
+big enough adversary can screw Tor users. But we knew that. I think it's
+great that the paper presents the dual risks of relay adversaries and
+link adversaries, since most of the time when people are freaking out
+about one of them they're forgetting the other one. And we really should
+raise the guard rotation period. If you do their compromise graphs again
+with guards rotated every nine months, they look way different."
+
+One tricky question with raising guard rotation period [XXX] is:
+“How do we keep clients properly balanced to match the guard
+capacities?” [XXX] It is also probably another signal for any Tails
+supporter that wish to help implementing guard persistence [XXX].
+
+“I have plans for writing a blog post about the paper, to explain what
+it means, what it doesn't mean, what we should do about it, and what
+research questions remain open” wrote Roger. Let's stay tuned!
 
 [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029755.html
 [XXX] http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
 [XXX] http://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2013/
 [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029756.html
 [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/8240
-[XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9321
 [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9321
 [XXX] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462
 
@@ -191,6 +175,10 @@
 00319.html
 Philipp Winter https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September
 /000320.html
+Roger Dingledine https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-Septemb
+er/000321.html
+Karsten Loesing https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-Septembe
+r/000322.html
 
 Help Desk Roundup
 -----------------
@@ -274,12 +262,12 @@
 [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005348.html
 [XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html
 
-Philipp Winter published final version of ScrambleSuit: A Polymorphic Network
-Protocol to Circumvent Censorship [XXX,XXX,XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://twitter.com/__phw/status/374643498177138688
+Philipp Winter published final paper version of the ScrambleSuit pluggable trans
+port [XXX],
+dubbed “A Polymorphic Network Protocol to Circumvent Censorship”.
+
+ [XXX] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
  [XXX] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/pdf/wpes2013.pdf
- [XXX] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint//scramblesuit/
 
 Upcoming events
 ---------------

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