[tor-talk] Is there a limit to how many .onion addresses I can generate/advertise/use for one hidden service?

Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists lists at infosecurity.ch
Wed Nov 29 18:08:11 UTC 2017



On 17/11/2017 05:51, Cyberpotato wrote:
> Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate and/or use to access a single hidden service? The use case would be to generate a unique .onion address/descriptor for each user of a hidden service. If i were to generate and advertise/introduce, let's say 500 (or more) unique hidden service descriptors, would there be any issue with that? Is building & maintaining that many circuits practical or possible?

Yes, it's possible but Tor will crash:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15251

GlobaLeaks project do integrate Tor with dynamic setup of Tor Onion
Services and by Q1/2018 will release a project that require setup of
about 9600 Tor Onion Services, so we will probably work on it somehow.

Each GlobaLeaks instance will have it's own HTTPS certificate enrolled
and maintained automatically with LetsEncrypt and it's own Onion Service.

This project will be setting up a virtual GlobaLeaks for each italian
public agencies in an automated way, as a massive-scale anti-corruption
project.

If someone is going or willing to support Tor debugging to achieve that
goal, we'll be more than happy.

Fabio


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