[tor-talk] Design of next-generation Tor systems

carlo von lynX lynX at time.to.get.psyced.org
Wed Jun 22 12:09:30 UTC 2016


Paul, I thank you for the honor of "proofreading" that page.

On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 07:16:21AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 07:39:22PM +0200, carlo von lynX wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 12:48:38PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > > Well there's things like alpha-mixing (better tau-mixing) as that
> > 
> > Yes, alpha-mixing would be a great step forward I guess.
> > Would you say the things I wrote on http://secushare.org/anonymity
> > regarding not building future work on Tor are accurate?
> > I wouldn't like to be stating anything stupid in there.
> 
> Not sure if accurate is an applicable notion here. I remain hopeful
> but dubious about anything that just assumes p2p automatically must be
> better for safety and privacy vs. client/server in the long run.

So you mean "p2p" in a very broad sense of anything that isn't
client/server? I avoid using "P2P" as many people still assume
that means that no Tor-like agnostic relays and back-end systems
are involved. This would certainly not be the case with secushare,
we want to learn that usability lesson from Tor.

> One reason is discussed in section 2.4 of
> "Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection"
> http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/danezis-pet2008.pdf
> For me this remains an open hard area that I continue to focus on.

Then you should find GNUnet's network size estimation (nse) module
quite interesting as it empowers cadet (the routing backend that
Bart describes in the video I linked in the previous mail) to know
when it is being attacked. So from my point of knowledge this issue
has been solved, but you may want to dig deeper with the designers
of this solution: Bart Polot and Christian Grothoff.

This also explains why George was so harsh on me when I defended
the idea of a clean-slate approach to dealing with the broken
Internet at the STRINT workshop. He simply doesn't know of this
progress that hasn't only been made on paper - it exists in running
code. He claimed there were unresolved issues in distributed routing
whereas to my knowledge this stuff is settled. Only in gnunet, but
that's enough for me now. Would love if you could check their work
and possibly come back to us with half a thumbs up. I think this is
the main reason why GNUnet has been seeing so much scientific and
financial attention over the years. It's not an amateur tool.

> And people who know me will tell you that I always say, "Dare to be
> stupid."  It's very hard to make any decent contributions if you are
> too afraid of looking dumb. 

Yup, never been my problem.  :)


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