[tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,

[Allen]

>
> So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the
> network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received or
> another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate the
> traffic right?


IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each node,
not just entering and exiting the network.  A mathematical model would be
needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would be
enough).  The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it could
chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.

It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, with
each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel one
route, while inbound packets travel a different route.