[tor-talk] trusting .onion services

[Rejo Zenger]

++ 20/01/16 21:59 +0000 - Oskar Wendel:
>> [2] OK. Not entirely true, maybe. It may be possible to include those
>> key in some listing of the directory authorities marking them as bad
>> nodes. This is a manual process.
>
>There should be a possibility to automate this process. Something like...

Yes. Just to make sure: this would solve only the problem that a key of 
HS may become compromised and some way of revocation should be 
available. It doesn't solve the other issues (as, making sure that some 
key actually does belong to the intended/expected owner).

>1. HS owner realizes that his HS key has been stolen (but he still has 
>his copy)
>
>2. HS owner creates the "revocation message" for the onion address, signs 
>it with his key and submits it to the DHT the same way a HS descriptor 
>is uploaded

The owner could create the revocation message right away and store it 
somewhere safe, just to make sure that if the key is stolen ánd deleted, 
the owner can still create a revocation certificate.



-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl

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