[tor-talk] Chaum Fathers Bastard Child To RubberHose ... PrivaTegrity cMix

[Jonathan Wilkes]

I was really hoping that Chaum had devised a way to use proof-of-work 
to impose a significant cost on deanonymization.  What I mean is 
that the nine servers would not only have to agree to unlock the backdoor, 
but that they (or some entity on their behalf) would need to expend a 
substantial amount of hashing power to actually recover the data that 
breaks one of the participant's privacy.
In such a system you'd "break the stalemate" by setting the POW to be 
difficult enough that the cost of breaking the anonymity of all participants 
exceeds the combined black budgets of the host countries by some factor.
But if math isn't going to be the warden of the system, I don't understand how 
it could be more secure than Tor.
Also, the bit about "distinct implementations" adding security to the system 
is a red flag.  Either his protocol is so trivial that it doesn't matter (unlikely), 
or the "distinct implementations" turn out to increase the attack surface through the complexity of subtle incompatibilities.  At least that's what I've heard from 
people who do security for a living...

-Jonathan
 

 

    On Thursday, January 7, 2016 1:54 AM, juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote:
 

 On
> Chaum is also building into PrivaTegrity another feature... a backdoor
> that allows anyone doing something "generally recognized as evil" 



    too stupid for words




> to
> have their anonymity and privacy stripped altogether.
> 
> Nine server council... a hoseablitly focus point similar to Tor
> dirauths. In any case... interesting.
> 
> https://www.scribd.com/doc/294737065/cMix-Anonymization-by-High-Performance-Scalable-Mixing

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