[tor-talk] On further minimizing harassment for Tor Exit Nodes

[Moritz Bartl]

On 01/02/2016 06:46 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists wrote:
> The worst risks is usually considered "being waked up at 6.00am in the
> morning by authorities" but there's no specific provision on reducing
> that risks.
> 
> The guidelines "Tips for Running an Exit Node with Minimal Harassment"
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment
> does not cover specifically this kind of risk.

Well, we do have "whois reassignment" and "create an organization" and
other things like that in the guidelines that are also aimed at reducing
this risk.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorExitGuidelines

> We could trigger that if a Tor Exit operator would be able to have an
> ExitPolicy that deny traffic going to the destination IPs of the country
> where it's located, leading any kind of abuses to be originated because
> of Tor Exit traffic flowing to a foreign country.

You can achieve something similar by placing your relay in a country
other than your own, without the need of complicated rulesets.

The only way I can see to try and achieve this would be GeoIP databases.
You know as much as I do that geoIP databases are very rough at best,
and I don't see how you would keep a geoIP database current across the
whole network. In practice, if you don't want to drop certain requests
as an exit, you cannot make it more than a "wish" of the exit relay that
a client may still violate. In many cases Tor already comes with or
suggests a GeoIP database (Tor Browser, relays).

Another argument for your suggestion would be that some day, traffic in
or to certain countries will be more troublesome than to others.
Something like this could also be used to influence your peering/transit
ratio to arrange cheaper deals.

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/