[tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network

[Oskar Wendel]

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Seth David Schoen <schoen at eff.org>:

> As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> even without knowing the complete path.

Is it possible to be sure that one of these connecting clients is in fact 
a client and not just intermediate relay in the circuit?

How many relays with guard flag are there? What is the percentage of 
relays with guard flag set in population of all relays?

Recently there was a bug corrected (#17772) when all relays were treated 
like entry guards, while only relays with a guard flag should be treated 
like entry guards. Correcting this bug obviously made "entry guard pool" 
smaller. Can it make correlation attack easier, as now the attacker has 
a smaller pool (only relays with the guard flag) to consider and it's 
more probable that client will connect to a relay controlled or observed 
by the attacker?

- -- 
Oskar Wendel, o.wendel at wp.pl.REMOVE.THIS
Pubkey at https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=0x6690CC52318DB84C
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