[tor-talk] Massive Bandwidth Onion Services
alec.muffett at gmail.com
Mon Dec 19 16:46:41 UTC 2016
On 19 December 2016 at 16:19, Allen <allenpmd at gmail.com> wrote:
> I got that point, that your service will have 60+ intro points.
...in six distinct descriptors, each containing 10 intro points, each of
_those_ attached to one tor daemon.
also said "people accessing the service onion address at lunchtime
> will receive/cache different descriptors from those who access it some
> hours later",
which lead me to believe that a single client will not
> "see" all of those 60+ intro points.
Strictly, the way that Tor works, the client will query the HSdir and
receive 1 (one) descriptor, of the 6, containing a random selection of 10
> So that question is, if you
> change HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints = 1 to implement your
> proposal, if a single Tor client does one and only one lookup on your
> Tor hidden service, how many intro points will it see and be able to
> connect to?
Each of the 60 "actual" Tor Daemons sets "NumIntroductionPoints = 1"
Then the OnionBalance software creates one more, virtual, somewhat
"parasitic" set of descriptors - which comprise the 6x10=60 alluded-to
Any given introduction point in the parasitic set of OnionBalance
descriptors, is actually a descriptor stolen from one of the 60 separate
daemons (- these daemons having set NumIntroductionPoints = 1)
Is that a better explanation?
More information about the tor-talk