[tor-talk] Massive Bandwidth Onion Services

Allen allenpmd at gmail.com
Mon Dec 19 16:19:52 UTC 2016


I got that point, that your service will have 60+ intro points.  You
also said "people accessing the service onion address at lunchtime
will receive/cache different descriptors from those who access it some
hours later", which lead me to believe that a single client will not
"see" all of those 60+ intro points.  So that question is, if you
change HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints = 1 to implement your
proposal, if a single Tor client does one and only one lookup on your
Tor hidden service, how many intro points will it see and be able to
connect to?

On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Alec Muffett <alec.muffett at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 19 December 2016 at 14:04, Allen <allenpmd at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> AFAIK, HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints >= 3 is also for the benefit
>> of the client, so if intro point #1 doesn't work for the client, it
>> can try to connect at intro point #2, and then finally at intro point
>> #3 before giving up.  So let's say my Tor client looks up your Tor
>> hidden service descriptor and attempts to connect at intro point #1
>> and that fails.  What would/should it do at that point?  Give up?
>
>
> There's a big difference between your scenario and mine.
>
> There will still be multiple introduction points.
>
> There will, in fact, be 60 introduction points.
>
> But they will each be attached to one of 60 different tor daemons, as
> opposed to the existing best practice of 1 daemon x 10 introduction points,
> replicated in 6 descriptors. (1 x 6 x 10 == 60)
>
> I understand this is a bit hard to explain with just words, so I posted a
> couple of slides at:
>
>     https://twitter.com/AlecMuffett/status/810871233139052545
>
> ...but I could only fit 4x tor daemons on the slides, instead of 60.
>
> I would post the slides here, but I believe that the maillist scrubs
> attachments.
>
>     - alec
>
>
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