[tor-talk] Mailpile SMTorP [ref: nexgen P2P email]

Jonathan Wilkes jancsika at yahoo.com
Wed May 27 01:10:36 UTC 2015


On 05/26/2015 07:36 PM, carlo von lynX wrote:
> On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 12:03:24PM -0700, Yuri wrote:
>> On one hand, Mailpile is after security, which is great. But on the
>> other hand they use node which doesn't sign packages, therefore
> What a shame! Somebody please fix this node thing. I can't
> believe these nodejs enthusiastos are playing around with all
> kinds of crypto something javascript applications but build
> on top of a house of cards.
>
> I still have plenty of criticism for SMTP and the idea of
> doing PGP on top of SMTP but having the server run as a
> hidden service from my own laptop gives this architecture
> quite a legitimacy boost.
>
> While with a mail system like Pond the few popular servers
> can be deanonymized by confirmation attack, then taken over
> by authorities and subdued to send traffic shaped messages
> back to the users, thus slowly deanonymizing the entire
> social graph of Pond users... SMTorP appears to me to be a
> better idea.
>
> With both send and reception points on the user's laptop,
> an attacker that wants to inject a traffic shape into the
> Tor network needs to take over the laptop itself. From my
> understanding there is no other place on the network
> where that sort of attack would be successful.
>
> If that is true, that would be a great progress. Too bad
> that the old problem of both having to be online at the
> same time is re-introduced. We could have started using
> Retroshare over Tor two years ago to achieve the same goal.
> Retroshare looks a little less fancy than Mailpile, but
> it doesn't need any pip or node.
>
> Also Framstag's sendfile SAFT implementation can be a neat
> quickfix solution. The server is easily pluggable into a
> hidden service and provides for mail-like spooling of
> messages and native binary file transfers, without all
> the overhead of e-mail.

What about Bitmessage?

-Jonathan




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