[tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network
blackdeamon38 at gmail.com
Thu Dec 31 14:13:03 UTC 2015
" That's definitely an improvement, although there's an issue in the long
run that the crypto in HTTPS is getting better faster than the crypto
in Tor's hidden services implementation. :-) "
I don't understand why you are saying that this is an 'issue'.
If one of the crypto tech is getting better, the tor stack will be improved
in its whole, isn't it ?
Moreover, i've read that some 'ssl authoritie' is now allowing registration
of .onion domains.
Le jeudi 31 décembre 2015, Seth David Schoen <schoen at eff.org> a écrit :
> Aeris writes:
> > > Does it apply also to traffic going from/to hidden services? How safe
> > > users of hidden services when compared to users that browse clearnet
> > > Tor?
> > Correlation is possible but very more difficult, because 3 nodes for
> client to
> > rendez-vous points, then 3 others for rendez-vous to HS.
> As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> even without knowing the complete path. This is even possible with
> a hidden service because the server that provides the hidden service
> also uses an entry guard of its own, which is the "endpoint" for traffic
> correlation purposes when a user is contacting the hidden service, despite
> the much longer (and so harder to observe) path within the Tor network.
> The lack of security improvement from longer path lengths is described in
> > Strength of HS is also to not have clearnet output, even if the « exit »
> > of one of the circuits id compromised, an attacker can’t access clear
> > Not the case on the standard case, when compromised exit node have
> access to
> > all the user data if HTTPS is not used.
> That's definitely an improvement, although there's an issue in the long
> run that the crypto in HTTPS is getting better faster than the crypto
> in Tor's hidden services implementation. :-)
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