[tor-talk] latest generation traffic confirmation attacks

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Sat Nov 29 02:25:37 UTC 2014

On 11/28/14, Mansour Moufid <mansourmoufid at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> They implemented new traffic confirmation attacks that cannot be
> detected by the end points, based on some radar techniques.  They
> don't mention it but the attacks can be implemented in real time.
> They can also decrease the false positive rate by increasing the
> bandwidth of the DSSS chip.  A patient enough attacker can have no
> false positives.

a multi-path wide socket datagram based stochastically re-ordered and
shaped transport overlay with optimized dependent link padding would
keep such a coding recoverable confirmation in the dark, indefinitely.
[citation needed]

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