[tor-talk] anonabox : the Tor hardware router
hellekin at gnu.org
Thu Nov 13 17:03:48 UTC 2014
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On 11/13/2014 10:45 AM, Derric Atzrott wrote:
>> If my bank, for example, sees
>> Tor IPs, it might freeze my account. And that's a _good_ thing.
> I disagree. I'd rather have more people using Tor even for things
> where identity is an essential part of authenticating you, like a bank.
*** Seconded. Even if you want your bank to authenticate you, I see no
good in having your bank knowing where you are, what you do, all the
time. I have a counter-example now, a friend of mine escaped conviction
for murder because of a credit card transaction demonstrating he was
somewhere else when the murder took place.
Black and white are a weak approximation. A weak approximation doesn't
survive a reality check. There are indeed two aspects to consider: one
is that using Tor for non-anonymity-critical aspects provides both more
stress on the infrastructure, and more cover traffic for people who
actually need the anonymity; two, more Tor users mean more Tor
infrastructure cost. Those are two correlated issues, but need to be
considered separately, otherwise you fall into the trap of using Tor
selectively, where the goal would rather be to use Tor in every occasion
so that global surveillance is much harder. If that goal seems too
extreme, it doesn't matter: the natural growth of Tor usage makes the
argument stand for itself. You cannot prevent users from using Tor for
any purpose (freedom 0), not only because the license says so, but also
because it's a fact: are you going to spy on Tor users to determine what
is legitimate or not?
More usage will bring more infrastructure cost: that has to be
addressed, because the Tor network is relatively dependent on U.S.
military budget. Not that I appreciate those bucks go into Tor rather
than in Gaza or Ferguson. But you get the picture: don't put all your
eggs in the same basket.
>> Well, I gather that there's currently a surplus of non-exit relays and
>> bandwidth. So specifically they should contribute exit relays. That's
>> not so easy, however, and there's far too little support for it from the
>> Tor Project, in my (albeit limited) experience.
> This is definitely a problem that I would love to see worked on some.
*** Indeed, more exit relays would be great. And router projects that
incorporate Tor can be a great way to add a plethora of them. Except
maybe having a plethora of low-bandwidth exit nodes is not so
attractive. I would also love to see more exit nodes.
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