[tor-talk] Tor Blog: "Thoughts and Concerns about Operation Onymous"
matthew.finkel at gmail.com
Sun Nov 9 19:50:21 UTC 2014
On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 08:48:35AM -0800, coderman wrote:
> Griffin, Matt, Adam, Roger, David, George, Karen, and Jake worked on a
> wonderful write up of all the questions and concerns regarding this
Thanks for sending this!
For those who read this earlier, two new paragraphs were added:
Under "Attacks on the Tor network":
*Similarly, there exists the attack where the hidden service selects
the attacker's relay as its guard node. This may happen randomly or
this could occur if the hidden service selects another relay as its
guard and the attacker renders that node unusable, by a denial of
service attack or similar. The hidden service will then be forced to
select a new guard. Eventually, the hidden service will select the
And under "Advice to concerned hidden service operators"
*Another possible suggestion we can provide is manually selecting the
guard node of a hidden service. By configuring the EntryNodes option
in Tor's configuration file you can select a relay in the Tor network
you trust. Keep in mind, however, that a determined attacker will
still be able to determine this relay is your guard and all other
attacks still apply.
* Added information about guard node DoS and EntryNodes option - 2014/11/09 18:16 UTC
> the performance link to doc/TUNING shows it could use much help.
> currently this is minimal, focused on file descriptor limits. more
> tuning guidance is needed!
> there is a good thread a few years past on tor-relays,
> , which could provide instruction for additional knobs to turn for a
> solid relay or client under load.
More information about the tor-talk