[tor-talk] Blacklists

C B cb736 at yahoo.com
Thu Mar 13 22:42:05 UTC 2014

I just complained to a company that I got a 403 from using TBB when I went to their website, and they said they had no control, their webhost was doing it, but passed the information on to them, and this is the response from the webhost:

I checked with the team and our system doesn't specifically block Tor but we do have security provisions in place to detect malicious attacks against the system (such as potential DoS attacks). Given the nature of Tor, it could be that these users are being picked up by the system. 

Are they seeing specific errors (like a 50x error)? We may be able to get a ticket going so that the team can dig in a bit further.  Also, if they provide their originating IP address, we can check our logs for more details.
This is the site I was trying to reach. http://cleantechnica.com/2013/10/23/tesla-model-s-optimized-for-autobahn-video/

Christopher Booth

 From: Martin Kepplinger <martink at posteo.de>
To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org 
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2014 9:45 AM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Blacklists

Use services that don't block Tor. Tell the other operator why you are 
leaving. Ask admins or poke any adress you find from a website that is 
important to you, that blocks us, why they are doing so. Tell your 
friends to use TBB, it's awesome how useable is it nowadays. They should 
just "click to play" flashplayer and just about anyone can use it. It's 
the best browser there is. Tor Browsers have to become visible to 
(still?) friendly website operators.

It's annoying sometimes but overall I know why I'm doing it and I keep 
doing it. It's tiny steps but the only steps to a situation (maybe) 
where every private home connection can be an Exit and the Internet 
doesn't react in any way to it. I'm glad the torproject offers to 
"discriminate" Tor users, it can be done anyways. I just hope it becomes 
less and less affordable.

Am 11.03.2014 14:06 schrieb Praedor Tempus:
> I think the thinking needs re-thinking.  Tor becomes less and less
> useful, and less and less attractive to users as more and more sites
> block tor.  The diminishing returns feeds itself.  More people quit
> using tor because many or most of the sites they are interested in
> prevent them from viewing them, fewer and fewer relays are provided as
> people quit tor, tor becomes weaker and weaker.  Rinse, repeat. 
> I do not think sites should be able to simply block classes of
> traffic just because they want to.  Blocking a spammer is one thing,
> it is a response to a single demonstrable negative action but blocking
> an entire class is what anti-discrimination laws in the real world are
> used to stop.  Because it is unjust and simply bad.  Why should it be
> different on the internet? Carve out the internet from basic societal
> rules/laws so discrimination by class is perfectly OK?  
> I'm merely stating that the simple ability to make a quick and easy
> setting change in the exit is all that is needed, not an automatic and
> broad default change to tor exit behaviors.  
> Responding to growing blacklists by shrugging one's shoulders and
> saying, "Oh well, you're wrong to do so but...oh well" is not a
> functional response.  It is a promise of less and less usefulness of
> tor...unless the ultimate goal is to provide, in the end, just an
> anonymous chat infrastructure since that seems to be the ultimate end
> point as sites block tor in greater numbers.
> ________________________________
>  From: krishna e bera <keb at cyblings.on.ca>
> To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
> Sent: Monday, March 10, 2014 10:10 PM
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Blacklists
> On 14-03-10 06:37 PM, Praedor Tempus wrote:
>> I was wondering...would a change to tor exits so they direct through 
>> public proxies/anonymizers get around black lists?  The tor user would 
>> still be anonymized but the ultimate source address seen by 
>> blacklisting websites would NOT be a tor exit so blocking tor exits 
>> would fail...
>> Is this too simple?  Perhaps add a setting that those who run exits 
>> could configure so their exit routes to a proxy? 
>> praedor
> The FAQ gives 3 reasons why Torproject doesnt encourage that 
> particular
> solution to blocking of Tor:
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
> To quote therefrom:
> a.    We can't help but make the information available, since Tor
> clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want
> it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients
> about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of
> connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the 
> addresses
> they see.
> b.    If people want to block us, we believe that they should be 
> allowed
> to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users 
> to
> connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their 
> services
> should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous
> users, they can.
> c.    Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a
> persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor.
> Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about 
> whether
> they really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if
> not, what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise
> have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their 
> overall
> approach to privacy and anonymity.
> --
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