[tor-talk] [tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?

ra r.a at posteo.net
Tue Mar 11 08:09:03 UTC 2014

On Monday 10 March 2014 19:37:25 grarpamp wrote:
> > http://cryptome.org/2013/09/tor-analysis-hidden-services.pdf
> Do you seriously think that reporters, aid workers, freedom
> fighters, investigators, whistleblowers, and simple chatfriends,
> etc are going to publish their onions for all to see, with all their
> data and logs and so on as some kind of stage show for you?
> The answere to that is no. They have better good and private
> things to do that do not concern you until it hits the AP wire.
> So of course all you're goin to see on the public onions
> are a bunch of channers, criminals, crazy loons and a
> growing scattering of real projects and clearnet multihomes.
> Unlike clearnet, any statistic over the onions you can see is
> simply not going to be representative of the whole of onionspace,
> quite a bit of which you cannot see.

If I understand you correctly, you basically state that their data does not 
match the underlying set. Can you elaborate on why you think this is the case? 
As far as I understood, they used public *and* private onions. But I am not 
that match into hidden services, so I may be wrong.

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