[tor-talk] [tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?

Ted Smith tedks at riseup.net
Mon Mar 10 19:19:58 UTC 2014

On Mon, 2014-03-10 at 14:37 -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> > [oh the bad..., re: ]
> > http://cryptome.org/2013/09/tor-analysis-hidden-services.pdf
> Do you seriously think that reporters, aid workers, freedom
> fighters, investigators, whistleblowers, and simple chatfriends,
> etc are going to publish their onions for all to see, with all their
> data and logs and so on as some kind of stage show for you?
> The answere to that is no. They have better good and private
> things to do that do not concern you until it hits the AP wire.
> So of course all you're goin to see on the public onions
> are a bunch of channers, criminals, crazy loons and a
> growing scattering of real projects and clearnet multihomes.

It looks like this paper scraped hidden service descriptors from
directories, as in 
A. Biryukov, I. Pustogarov, and R.-P. Weinmann.
Trawling for tor hidden services: Detection,
measurement,deanonymization. In IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pages 80–94, 2013.

This would pick up private onions as well as publicized ones.

That paper concludes rather more positively, though:

> The number of hidden services with illegal content or devoted
> to illegal activities and the number of other hidden services
> (devoted to human rights, freedom of speech, anonymity, se-
> curity, etc.) is almost the same; among Tor hidden services
> one can even find a chess server.

Sent from Ubuntu
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