[tor-talk] Current attack of TOR to break anonymity

Martin Kepplinger martink at posteo.de
Fri Mar 7 10:51:32 UTC 2014

Am 2014-03-07 11:32, schrieb Maimun Rizal:
> Dear All,
> is there any attack can be break anonymity in TOR network? if so, how?
> I assume, if I want to break anonymity in the TOR network, I should take
> control all of relays which are used by sender and destination as a
> transmission media.
> with this assumption, It is easy to show the differences attacker
> probability in TOR network 2 relays or more relays.
> some papers explained that TOR network can be broke by attacker take
> control in entry and exit relays. so what differences if we use more relays
> on path-link?
> even there is attacker only need entry relays to break anonymity in TOR
> network. so the path-link does not affect the level of anonymity.
> where I can find the source explanation the kind of attacks that related
> with path-link of the TOR network?
> or how can we show it, with less relays on path-link will have less
> anonymity?
> if no differences, why TOR network use 3 TOR relays instead of 2 TOR relays
> in path-link?

I think because in a 2 hop scenario the entry node (that knows its next
hop) knows that that very node (exit) knows the destination (and often
contents) of the packets. Both nodes learn significantly more than in a
3 hop scenario.

And there would be _no_ middle relays, so running a random relay would
provide the administrator with entry information plus the exact server,
where the exit information to any given connection could be found, or
vice versa.

In our 3 hop scenario the middle relay takes care of seperating entry
and exit information.

There may be other reasons.

> Thank you for advanced,
> Regards,
> MR

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