[tor-talk] Blacklisting CVE-2014-0224 affected relays? (was: Yet another OpenSSL vulnerability)
Nusenu
BM-2D8wMEVgGVY76je1WXNPfo8SrpZt5yGHES at bitmessage.ch
Sun Jun 8 10:55:24 UTC 2014
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Hello,
> The circuit-layer crypto (which happens under the TLS layer)
> should still provide significant protection for user communications
> over Tor. But a MITM attack of this kind could still help traffic
> analysis, and likely other unexpected badness as well.
Will the Torproject - or more specifically the directory authorities
again blacklist affected relays (in this case only until they
upgraded) after the majority upgraded?
Has anyone done any measurements to determine how many relays are
running a vulnerable openssl version?
Did anyone run Adam Langley's check script against the tor consensus yet?
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html
https://www.imperialviolet.org/binary/earlyccs_check.go
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