[tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?
phw at nymity.ch
Thu Jul 31 21:15:28 UTC 2014
On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 01:58:18PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Roger Dingledine writes:
> > But in this particular case I'm stuck, because the arms race is so
> > lopsidedly against us.
> > We can scan for whether exit relays handle certain websites poorly,
> > but if the list that we scan for is public, then exit relays can mess
> > with other websites and know they'll get away with it.
> I think the remedy is ultimately HTTPS everywhere. Then the problem
> is reduced to checking whether particular exits try to tamper with the
> reliability or capacity of flows to particular sites, or with the public
> keys that those sites present. (And figuring out whether HTTPS and its
> implementations are cryptographically sound.)
It's not just about HTTP. We've also seen attacks targeting SSH, SMTP,
IMAP, FTP, and XMPP. While SSH's trust-on-first-use works reasonably
well and MitM attacks tend to be ineffective, XMPP is a different story
with at least one major client having had issues with authentication.
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