[tor-talk] Cancelled black hat talk

Nusenu BM-2D8wMEVgGVY76je1WXNPfo8SrpZt5yGHES at bitmessage.ch
Wed Jul 30 22:56:58 UTC 2014


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> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 10:05:20PM +0000, Nusenu wrote:
>> Surprised to see the fix of a bug that was worth a tor security 
>> advisory to be in the "Minor bugfixes" section of the changelog.
> 
> The security advisory was that somebody had attacked real Tor users
> and perhaps deanonymized some of them, and here's what we know.
> 
> The particular traffic confirmation channel they used wasn't a big
> deal. (Or said another way, fixing it doesn't make a big impact on
> whether this sort of attack is possible.)

Thanks for your quick clarification.

If I understand you correctly that means we should assume this type of
attack to be "easy" and this fix merely closes one of many easy ways
to exploit traffic confirmation?

So I guess one of the best bets we have is better response to doctor
reports?  (aka better detection)

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