[tor-talk] Why does requesting for bridges by email require a Yahoo or Gmail address?
The Caped Wonderwoman
caped_wonderwoman at zoho.com
Sun Jul 27 06:45:34 UTC 2014
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And predictably, five minutes after I send that message, I find the confirmation in the other account's spam trap. Apologies for that.
On July 27, 2014 2:09:52 AM EDT, The Caped Wonderwoman <caped_wonderwoman at zoho.com> wrote:
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>The difficulty of obtaining a Riseup account may be prohibitive for a
>lot of people, especially if they need a bridge quickly for whatever
>reason. Anecdotally, I requested one under a different identity over a
>week ago and have yet to hear back. In some situations, that's an
>eternity, and while I'm sure it would go more quickly with an invite,
>that presupposes knowing someone who has one to offer.
>As a side note, I'm always slightly surprised by how few mentions Zoho
>gets. They're nowhere near perfect, but compared to Google, Yahoo, and
>such, at least they don't mine your email for targeted advertising,
>they have a business model where the user is the customer, and their
>fingerprint your browser to see where you go and what you do on our
>site, but we won't read your mail or follow you around the Internet").
>On July 26, 2014 3:16:03 AM EDT, Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> wrote:
>>On 07/25/2014 11:31 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> Do we underestimate the social net in oppressed that gives
>>> them awareness of tor, and to obtain binary and share bridge
>>> info in the first place?
>>Maybe we do. But what about carelessness, poor judgment and the
>>prevalence of informers? Wouldn't it be better to have a system that
>>protected bridges by design?
>>> Or that oppressor will not burn $cheap govt SIM and IP army
>>> to get and block bridges from gmail to @getbridges?
>>Right. Requiring hard-to-get email addresses does make it harder to
>>bridge IPs. But who does that impact the most, potential users or
>>adversaries? Is there relevant evidence?
>>> This is difficult.
>>Please excuse the repetition, but DNS-based fast flux (Proximax) with
>>selection-based dropping of domain names associated with bridge
>>is the best possibility that I've seen. Rather than trying to prevent
>>adversaries from joining the system, it recursively isolates based on
>>tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
>>To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
>Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
>And the cape.
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Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. And the cape.
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