[tor-talk] Decoupling hidden service from relay behavior on the same machine (was: Re: Can NAT traversal be Tor's killer feature?)

Helder Ribeiro helder at discor.de
Fri Jul 11 05:28:57 UTC 2014

On Thu, Jul 10, 2014 at 9:31 PM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote:
> On 7/11/14, Helder Ribeiro <helder at discor.de> wrote:
> Excessive popularity/ usage, without measures to 'encourage' or
> otherwise to automatically facilitate expansion of the network may
> well lead to network degradation.
> Skype super-nodes or whatever they are (were?) called, are
> automatically created on nodes where Skype detected sufficient
> bandwidth and no blocking firewall, AIUI. UPnP comes to mind.

The issue with turning the user's machine into both a hidden service
and a relay is that by hitting the hidden service with heavy traffic
and checking whether a particular relay has gone down or changed its
available bandwidth an attacker can correlate both, and relay IP
addresses are publicly known.

But doesn't that fall under “traffic confirmation”, which is not
something Tor tries to protect against?

Also, for behavior other than both going offline at the same time,
there might be something that can be done to isolate resources for the
relay and hidden service processes so that the fact that one has maxed
out their share doesn't show up in the other's externally observable
behavior. Don't shared hosting/virtualization solutions do this?

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