[tor-talk] BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000

[Lunar]

AntiTree:
> If I were a betting person, a beer says that they will be summarizing the
> current issues with hidden services, and as Adrian said, doing a client
> side disbanding attack (e.g. Java + DNS)

My own speculations is that they have used the attacks on guard relays
described in the following blog post, maybe in combination with other
attacks:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters

They wanted a NDA, so most Tor Project's core contributors don't know
what's in the air.

Improving the situations of guard relays is tricky to get right. There's
an open proposal in discussion:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/236-single-guard-node.txt

It will also be a “hot topic” at the next Privacy Enhancing Technology
Symposium:
https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Dingledine.pdf
https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/hotpets.php

-- 
Lunar                                             <lunar at torproject.org>
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