[tor-talk] Idea: Public verification of exit nodes and their maintainers - Fwd: [tor-relays] specifying your own entrance and exit nodes

usprey usprey at gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 05:21:13 UTC 2014

Thanks for the feedback! =)

I am thinking of basing a tor exit web of trust on https://keybase.io/docs API
and at least requiring to have http proofs on, and dns proofs in relation
to, the exit nodes as well as including public key fingerprint in

http proofs (txt-files) can easily be supported in the existing source like
DirPortFrontPage is now.

A user would then be able to compile a list of all nodes supporting keybase
verification, filter it if wanted, verify the information and choose to
trust all or a specific set of the nodes supporting this scheme.

Please note https://keybase.io (http://fncuwbiisyh6ak3i.onion) is currently
in "Private Beta", I have invites if anybody is interested.

If any exit node maintainers would like to support this scheme as an
independent initiative, please let me know so we can see if there is enough
support to justify the effort.

Any concerns about this model?

On 12 December 2014 at 02:08, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika at yahoo.com>
> wrote:
> > grarpramp,If Tor only consisted of hidden services, wouldn't this class
> of traffic-fudging problems go away? (I'm assuming the handful of
> centralized services most people use would just generate vanity addys.)
> No. Sybils / forgeries are influence attacks on the network itself (evil
> nodes,
> eg: identities). Compromise the network and whatever rides on top of
> it is compromised. Though attack on users by evil exits literally sniffing
> goes away if the network has no exit feature (only hidden), nodes are
> still relays, and Sybil there is still Sybil, regardless of her purpose.
> (Such as getting lucky enough to carry your entire circuit, or modulate
> your traffic flows.)
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack
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