[tor-talk] Exit node stats collection?

[mirimir]

On 09/04/2013 05:33 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote:

> On 09/04/2013 07:14 PM, The Doctor wrote:
>> http://cybermashup.com/2013/09/04/dont-run-a-tor-router-and-a-hidden-service-from-the-same-connection/
>> Thoughts from the community?
> 
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
> 
> Last sentence: "It is generally a better idea to host hidden services on
> a Tor client rather than a Tor relay, since relay uptime and other
> properties are publicly visible."
> 
> I agree that this could be stated more clearly and visibly.

Perhaps these 1.8e+6 (standard stats) to 4.0e+6 (beta stats) new Tor
clients members of a botnet designed, at least in part, to securely and
redundantly host hidden services. The demise of Freedom Hosting may have
stimulated some creative thinking.

Also, if this were a botnet, I would expect it to show up in honeypots.
Wouldn't its bots be easily detected, through searching for Tor
connections? Having the vector might be very informative.