[tor-talk] Exit node stats collection?

mirimir mirimir at riseup.net
Wed Sep 4 07:22:56 UTC 2013


On 09/04/2013 05:56 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:

> On Wed, 04 Sep 2013 10:36:32 +0000, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> ...
>> For example if all of these new users are in fact a single botnet, that's now
>> connecting to Tor and then sitting dormant waiting for an order to instantly
>> DDoS into the ground any hidden service that publishes "undesirable" info...
>>
>> Then will you still argue we can't discriminate against that?
> 
> Do you mean "can't" or "don't want to"?

I think that he meant "can't honourably", but the reality may be "can't" :(

>> At this point it could be that more than 70% of all Tor users globally are
>> just this botnet. Hidden service DDoS from all of them could turn out to be
>> very effective.

It's more like 80% now.

> I seriously don't think you'd need any kind of a botnet to take out a few
> hidden services - you'd just need to rent a few good root servers.

You don't even need that with slowloris :(

> And *that* botnet is almost ridiculously large in size compared to
> the tor network. It would have no problem whatsoever DDoSing all
> the exit nodes, for example.

What other information can the Tor network collect about this
hypothetical botnet? Or do we just need to wait for it to do something
obvious?

> Andreas
> 



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