[tor-talk] Exit node stats collection?

Roman Mamedov rm at romanrm.net
Wed Sep 4 04:36:32 UTC 2013


On Tue, 3 Sep 2013 22:02:39 +0100
Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org> wrote:

> To answer the OP: how can we tell "malicious users" from "valid users". I understand your POV, but surely we can't discriminate? Or can we?

For example if all of these new users are in fact a single botnet, that's now
connecting to Tor and then sitting dormant waiting for an order to instantly
DDoS into the ground any hidden service that publishes "undesirable" info...

Then will you still argue we can't discriminate against that?

At this point it could be that more than 70% of all Tor users globally are
just this botnet. Hidden service DDoS from all of them could turn out to be
very effective.

That's why I think there needs to be some way to identify what majority of the
users are up to. I understand that detecting which hidden service is being
connected to might be hard to impossible, but exit connections are out there
in the open, it is not difficult to collect stats on them.

> there should be no increase in exit traffic.

"They are just not using any exit connections" would also be an extremely
valuable data point to have.

-- 
With respect,
Roman
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