[tor-talk] New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries
arma at mit.edu
Tue Sep 3 18:09:58 UTC 2013
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:22:33PM +0000, adrelanos wrote:
> Roger Dingledine:
> > And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you
> > do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months,
> > they look way different."
> TBB releases are more frequent than every nine months. With each TBB
> release, people are getting new entry guards. Are there plans to address
Excellent point. This is a good argument for being able to unpack a new
TBB on top of the old one -- which I'm told usually works, but doesn't
always work, and that's a big problem.
Longer term, the right answer is to use the Firefox update mechanism in
TBB 3.0 to update, in place, only the parts that need updating.
...unless there are better answers?
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