[tor-talk] A new check

krishna e bera keb at cyblings.on.ca
Tue Oct 29 13:39:11 UTC 2013

On 13-10-29 04:38 AM, Lunar wrote:
> grarpamp:
>> Keep in mind that while it may be frustrating to some users config
>> tests to find that they are temporarily using a false negative exit...
>> this 'multihoming' could, and should in fact, be considered a feature
>> since it keeps some exits out of the reach of anti-tor blocklists
>> that simply parse all the IP's out of the descriptor set.
> I have to disagree here. While administrators who block Tor
> indiscriminately cause pain to every Tor users, we should solve the
> problem with education, not deception.

While i agree that education is always needed, the same argument also
applies to content censorship and human rights persecution: we should
educate governments and the ignorant masses that the answer to
information you dont like is to publish trustworthy information that you
do like.  However Tor exists in a world where that isnt enough, and
indeed relies on countries and users with (often) opposing interests for
its marketing and anonymity model.

Regarding the marketing high ground, are you claiming that steganography
modules and obfuscating proxies are not using deception?

On the other hand, perhaps allowing for the existence of hidden exit
nodes would tip the balance of tolerance that we currently have with
operators of destination internet sites and networks.

> On the technical side, TorDNSEL should properly detect the IP address
> used by exit nodes, so check.tpo should not report false negatives for
> multihomed exits. Otherwise, either the node did not had time to be
> tested, or there's a bug in TorDNSEL.
> Being able to add an extra CAPTCHA for Tor clients or other proxy
> services is a legitimate wish in face of abuses. Providing ways to do so
> that work reliably is more likely to help with indiscriminate bans.

Sounds good.

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