[tor-talk] What the NSA cares about getting and defenses

BM-2D9WhbG2VeKsLCsGBTPLGwDLQyPizSqS85 at bitmessage.ch BM-2D9WhbG2VeKsLCsGBTPLGwDLQyPizSqS85 at bitmessage.ch
Tue Oct 8 12:44:02 UTC 2013

Agree completely, and there are other security reasons--not to mention
NoScript configuration defaults--that also potentially favor
1) signature-based verification of all TBB components at launch,
2) potentially encouraging users to consider multiple TBB installations to
support/encourage compartmentalization, and especially
3) improved user education on the importance of using new identities, e.g.
prominently informing users via check.torproject.org.

Even just the javascript-mediated privacy violations that are possible via
the use of tabs (no Private Tab extension!) in TBB are pretty astonishing.

> ----- Forwarded message from Watson Ladd <watsonbladd at gmail.com> -----
> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 19:13:26 -0700
> From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd at gmail.com>
> To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: [tor-talk] What the NSA cares about getting and defenses
> Message-ID:
> <CACsn0cn1mGUWf7WYyNHn1Mnw8sWWqm3r+xX9wMhnd+iPmyA4_g at mail.gmail.com>
> Reply-To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
> Prompted by the Ars Technica reporting on QUANTUM, I took a look at the
> slide and read the text, as well as compared to the MULLINIZE document
> describing NAT breaking. My conclusion is that the NSA obtains significant
> amounts of information from user activity in between closing browsers, and
> that current Tor Browser Bundle remains vulnerable to this attack.
> QUANTUM appears to rely on inserting fake references to third party assets
> and manipulating cookies in the requests made by the browser in response.
> I
> propose that we block third party cookies unless over HTTPS to mitigate
> this problem, and try to encourage users to use more frequent new
> identities.
> MULLINIZE achieves the reliable tracking of individual users behind a NAT
> through similar tricks. It is clear that the NSA views this information as
> valuable, even without real-world addresses to tie to it. Linkability
> across pages is difficult: breaking sessions is a major cost of the
> obvious
> no cookies approach to preventing this sort of attack.
> Sincerely,
> Watson
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> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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