[tor-talk] The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic Misdirection

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Thu Nov 21 19:15:11 UTC 2013

On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Seth David Schoen <schoen at eff.org> wrote:
> ...
> You could use BGP redirection to become able to spy on traffic
> headed to a guard node or coming out of an exit node that would
> otherwise not have passed through networks that you control.
> The most relevant consequence of that would probably be increasing
> the probability that the attacker can successfully do a traffic
> correlation or confirmation attack.

active attacks, of various types, are also clearly possible.  the
impact of these varied, but possibly significant.

i recommend all relay ops sign up for cyclops alerts for suspicious
BGP behavior on their netblocks:

it's a bit noisy, but useful.

best regards,

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