[tor-talk] A question about hidden services and tor in general

DeveloperChris developerchris at rebel.com.au
Mon Nov 4 08:03:17 UTC 2013

On 04/11/2013 3:24 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client
>> I hate to say it that gives me no confidence at all. Only the randomly
>> chosen guard at the HS end needs to be compromised and the whole chain
>> becomes worthless. A timing attack will reveal all.
> I'd thought it trivial to time/packet/byte count and find the:
> - HS, IF you ran both its guard and a client.
> - Client, IF you ran both its guard and its destination
> of choice (HS/[clearnet/exit]).
> It depends on whether the guard has knowledge that some
> of the streams going through its relay function are in fact
> destined for a HS/client and not some other relay. I never
> properly followed up on that question...

This knowledge is trivial to obtain, a timing attack isn't even necessary. 
Whether that represents a true risk I haven't yet determined. I need to 
consider what surety one can have that the guard is not compromised.


More information about the tor-talk mailing list