[tor-talk] A question about hidden services and tor in general
grarpamp at gmail.com
Sun Nov 3 16:54:06 UTC 2013
>> HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client
> I hate to say it that gives me no confidence at all. Only the randomly
> chosen guard at the HS end needs to be compromised and the whole chain
> becomes worthless. A timing attack will reveal all.
I'd thought it trivial to time/packet/byte count and find the:
- HS, IF you ran both its guard and a client.
- Client, IF you ran both its guard and its destination
of choice (HS/[clearnet/exit]).
It depends on whether the guard has knowledge that some
of the streams going through its relay function are in fact
destined for a HS/client and not some other relay. I never
properly followed up on that question...
More information about the tor-talk