[tor-talk] NSA, Tempora, PRISM And Company always know who is behind Tor?

Nathan Suchy theusernameiwantistaken at gmail.com
Sat Jul 20 19:43:55 UTC 2013


The NSA cannot always know who is behind Tor. This is due to the fast that
tor uses a circut guard - middle - exit and unless the NSA can get access
to the guard's isp, the middle's isp, and the exit's isp which more than
one of them may be in a country that hates the US they can't see what your
doing and prove it was you. Also even if you had a .pcap of each networks
traffic it would be very difficult to put the information back together.


On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Ed Fletcher <ed at fletcher.ca> wrote:

> On 19/07/2013 9:23 AM, Tom Ritter wrote:
>
>> On 19 July 2013 06:35, Ed Fletcher <ed at fletcher.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> On a related note, does having (what I assume is) a serious percentage of
>>> the Tor relays in the Amazon cloud make it easier for the NSA to
>>> compromise
>>> anonymity?
>>>
>>
>> I don't think a 'series percentage' of relays are in EC2.  I would
>> politely ask you to research that and prove me wrong if you feel
>> strongly about it.  There might be a serious percentage of bridges,
>> but even that is questionable.  (Related: Runa is giving a talk at
>> Defcon on the Diversity of the Tor Network, so hopefully that will be
>> a canonical answer to these sorts of questions once her slides go up
>> in a couple weeks.)
>>
>
> My mistake.  I had thought that a bridge was a relay with extra
> functionality.  I'll have to do some more reading.  And thanks for the tip
> on the slides.  I'll look for them after Defcon is done.
>
> Ed
>
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Nathan Suchy
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