[tor-talk] Network diversity [was: Should I warn against Tor?]

[adrelanos]

Gregory Maxwell:
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 9:45 AM, adrelanos <adrelanos at riseup.net> wrote:
>> Seems like high latency mix networks failed already in practice. [1]
>>
>> Can't we somehow get confidence even against a global active adversary
>> for low latency networks? Someone start a founding campaign?
> 
> So have low latency ones, some things fail.  Today you'd answer that
> concern by running your high latency mix network over tor (or
> integrated into tor) and so it cannot be worse. Answering the "you
> need users first, and low latency networks are easier to get users
> for" concern.
> 
> The point there remains that if you're assuming a (near) global
> adversary doing timing attacks you cannot resist them effectively
> using a low latency network.  Once you've taken that as your threat
> model you can wax all you want about how low latency mix networks get
> more users and so on.. it's irrelevant because they're really not
> secure against that threat model. (Not that high latency ones are
> automatically secure either— but they have a fighting chance)

Are you really sure the fight is 100% lost and there is no way to deal
with global active adversaries for low latency networks?

See:
"Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous
Communication" [1]

Sounds quite good, doesn't it? Why isn't this path perused any further?
Sounds promising, doesn't it?

[1] http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/node/28