[tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata

Praedor Tempus praedor at yahoo.com
Tue Jul 2 15:51:48 UTC 2013


Would there be a way to "Freenet" the service?  Distribute it over many servers...no one actually knowing what clients they have, perhaps not even how many but operated over the tor network?


________________________________
 From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com>
To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org 
Sent: Tuesday, July 2, 2013 9:26 AM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
 

On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 11:15 PM, Andreas Krey <a.krey at gmx.de> wrote:
> ...
> Put new clients into the next instance of this service, formally
> operated by someone else?

you say this like there's an inexhaustible supply of dedicated
individuals / volunteers able to administer a business entity /
incorporation each with enough autonomy and self sufficiency to avoid
conspiracy charges ... ;)

i am skeptical this can scale in any meaningful sense; still better
than nothing?



> ...
> Lawful intercepts also include the access metadata (which I assume to
> be equally secure here), and access to the emails themselves. While
> encrypted the service still has to know source and destination to
> some extent.

the joy of email is that you defer hard problems like unlinkability,
psuedonymity, anonymity to lower layers where possible.  i agree that
"pen register" and other metadata is just as critical to privacy as
content - perhaps more so given the lack of constraints around access
to "pen register" metadata.

did i mention this is a hard problem?



> I guess under NSLs this could be construed as publishing same,
> so the NSL effectively forces you to stay in business.

"Due to circumstances outside our control we are no longer able to
provide customers with quality service. Effective immediately.
[datetimestamp]"
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