[tor-talk] Leave Your Cellphone at Home

Jago Pearce jago25 at gmail.com
Wed Jan 16 23:12:07 UTC 2013


How much improvement might flightmode realistically provide?
On the one hand, if you are a targetted individual it's basically not
going to provide any protection because with a rootkit it can be so
easily overridden.
However, for the average Joe such as myself who just likes to have a
little bit more privacy -just because- can this be a nice halfway
house? Schedule a flightmode switch every 2 hours to pick up txt SMS
messages.

What phone you are trying this on matters of course. If it's a closed
source Chinese phone then I think you can expect some kind of logging
similar to CarrierIQ anyway. However... perhaps that info isn't shared
with whoever it is using cellphone triangulation right?

So what about the scanario of a Replicant O/S phone will those Samsung
modem binary blobs? Do we really know if the modem is being switched
off or not? The only way to give some confidence (not full confidence)
might be to monitor for GSM with gnuradio or (hopefully) RTL-SDR... or
just put it next to some analug speakers?

Professional criminals use a different phone each time and pay cash.
They then have a life of basic phones and T9 text messaging. They then
buy a new phone when paranoia reaches some kind of random level.
Replicating this with smarter phones is sounds more difficult. I would
guess they swap infomation at prision - they are the experts. It would
be interesting to see what the more knowledgeable ones in there think
about how they got caught. If enough of that data could be collected
you'd have an insight. Major gangs might have some knowledge on this.
I wonder what they would say.

How would you monitor if you are being monitored. Because I travel a
lot including to places my country is at war with and read
mailinglists like this I tend to think I'm someone the man would be
interested in. There have been times where phone calls have gone
strange and so forth. Perhaps the systems I and people like me use
would be good for study. Do you have any links or google search terms
on people who have found tracking tech conclusively rather than
(possibly) paranoid hunches?


On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 10:39 AM,  <antispam06 at sent.at> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2012, at 01:56, Mansour Moufid wrote:
>> Anyway, I think cryptography will depend more and more on steganography
>> -- and in the case of Tor, covert/subliminal channels. Imagine a protocol
>> where Alice sends Bob a steady stream of garbage, and the message is
>> encoded in the inter-packet timing noise. ;)
>
> Actually, this kind of run is taking SciFi turns.
>
> In real life the act of comunication, simply connecting with someone
> else is more important than the message. Whatever you wish to call the
> adversary Alice and Bob are hiding from is more interested of the fact
> that Alice needs to connect with Bob than what the hell are they talking
> about. Encryption, reading between the lines, a rudimentary code that
> makes My grandma feels better into We go as planned, they are all to be
> established after subject interrogation. What they need is the web.
> Facebook if you prefer. Because we have established that we are tracking
> Alice or Bob. And we need the whole network.
>
> The stupidity of most of the books I have read on this theme stands
> around the concept of Truth. These organisations DO NOT care about
> whatever sense an outsider would place with the word truth. They might
> go for such truths as justifying their wages, pleasing a half mad boss,
> and so on. Many are connected with the propaganda machine. And quite
> often wars are waged among competing services. Think of a treasure hunt,
> the silly Easter Egg hunt for children executed by grown men trained to
> torture.
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